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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED: 
i. Preponderance o£ the evidence as the correct standard: 
Whether the general standard of proof required in civil actions, 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, is the correct standard 
to establish the existence of a common law marriage pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1995)? 
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review. This issue was 
preserved in the trial court in Mr. Hansen's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Record at 325. The trial court's 
conclusions of law should not be provided any particular 
deference and should be reviewed for correctness. The Court of 
Appeals is free to render its own independent interpretations of 
legislative intent and statutory applications on matters of law. 
Steele v. Breinholt, 747 p.2d 433, 434-35 (Utah ct. App. 1987). 
2. Violation of the Utah Constitution: Whether a statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1995), which requires a 
determination of a common law marriage within one year of the 
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termination of the relationship violates Article 1, Sections 7, 
11, and 24 of the Utah Constitution? 
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review. This issue was 
preserved in the trial court in Mr. Hansen's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Record at 321. The trial court's 
conclusions of law should not be provided any particular 
deference and should be reviewed for correctness. The Court of 
Appeals is free to render its own independent interpretations of 
legislative intent and statutory applications on matters of law. 
Steele v. Breinholt. 747 P.2d 433, 434-35 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL 
Section 30-1-4.5, Utah Code Ann. (1995) is determinative on 
appeal and is set forth in the Addendum to this brief. Articles 
7, 11, and 24 of the Utah Constitution are also determinative on 
appeal and are set forth in the Addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order signed and dated the 8th of 
May, 1997. Record at 350. 
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below 
Mr. Hansen filed a complaint on October 12, -1995. Mr. 
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Hansen's cause of action was for a determination of a common law 
marriage between Michael Hansen and Laura Hansen. The court 
dismissed Mr. Hansen's Complaint December 20, 1996. The court 
ruled that the burden of proof for a determination of the 
existence of a common law marriage is clear and convincing 
evidence and that Mr. Hansen had not met this standard. Mr. 
Hansen moved on the 18th of February to alter or amend the 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district 
court denied the Motion to Amend, concluding that the correct 
burden of proof is proof by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. 
Hansen appeals the district court's order. 
Statement of Facts 
1. The parties were previously married for a period of 
approximately nine years. Their divorce was final in March 1994. 
Record at 246-247. 
2. In October 1994, Mr. Hansen moved back into the marital 
home with Mrs. Hansen and resided there with her and their 
children until at least May 1995. Record at 246. 
3. From May 1995 through September 22, 1995, Mr. Hansen 
did not live at the marital home nor cohabit with her. Record at 
246. 
4. Judge Hansen previously made a finding in a protective 
order action between the parties that Mr. Hansen lived in the 
marital home again from September 22, 1995, through December 27, 
1995 at the request of Mrs. Hansen. Record at 246. 
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5. During the periods of cohabitation Mr. Hansen routinely 
turned over his paycheck to Mrs. Hansen and then received back 
some cash as "walking around money." Record at 246. 
6. During the periods of cohabitation Mrs. Hansen worked 
and pooled her money with the money that she received from Mr. 
Hansen. Record at 246. 
7. Mrs. Hansen used the money she and Mr. Hansen earned to 
pay a credit card debt Mr. Hansen had incurred during the period 
of separation preceding their divorce. She also used this pooled 
money to pay the home mortgage, to pay family living expenses and 
obligations and to pay her own debts. Record at 246. 
8. During the period of cohabitation the parties acted 
much like a family. Record at 246. 
9. When the parties' son was of age to be baptized into 
the L.D.S. church, the parties met with the local Bishop to 
arrange for the son's baptism. Neither party dispelled the 
appearance that they were a family. Record at 246. 
10. After Mr. Hansen moved back in with Mrs. Hansen, a 
membership clerk from the L.D.S. church came to inquire 
concerning Mr. Hansen's church membership records and was told 
that Mr. Hansen lived in the marital home. The appearance was 
that they were back together. Record at 245-46. 
11. Mrs. Hansen used Mr. Hansen's medical and dental 
insurance to cover the cost of some of her medical treatments. 
The coverage was only available to her as a wife and she claimed 
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the benefit of this coverage. Record at 245. 
12. During the time the parties cohabited Mrs. Hansen held 
herself out as Mr. Hansen's wife to the insurance carrier. 
Record at 245. 
13. During the period of cohabitation Mrs. Hansen 
frequently wore a ring on the finger of her left hand, 
traditionally viewed as her marriage finger. Record at 245. 
14. During the time the parties cohabited each was capable 
of giving consent to a marriage and each was legally capable of 
entering into a solemnized marriage. Record at 245. 
15. During the time the parties cohabited they each assumed 
marital rights, duties, and obligations. Record at 245. 
16. Mr. Hansen filed the Complaint of this matter, on or 
about the 12th of October, 1995, requesting a determination of 
the existence of a common law marriage between the parties. The 
Complaint was filed within one year of the termination of the 
Hansen's relationship. Record at 4. 
17. On the 2Qth of December, 1996; also within one year of 
the termination of the relationship, the court dismissed the 
Complaint for determination of a common law marriage. The court 
found that Mr. Hansen had failed to prove by "clear and 
convincing" evidence either that Mrs. Hansen consented to a 
marital relationship or that the parties acquired a general 
reputation as husband and wife. Record at 247. 
18. On the 18th of February, 1997
 r Mr. Hansen made a Motion 
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to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Record at 316. 
19. In an Order signed the 8th of May. 1997, the court 
denied Mr. Hansen's Motion to Amend. The court concluded as a 
matter of law that the standard of proof for the existence of a 
common law marriage is by clear and convincing evidence. Record 
at 350. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The correct burden of proof to determine the existence of a 
common law marriage is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is the general burden of 
proof in civil matters. This burden has been adopted by a 
majority of Utah's sister states that recognize common law 
marriage. Public policy favors proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence for determining the existence of a common law marriage. 
The Utah statute authorizing common law marriage is 
unconstitutional under Article 1, Sections 7, 11, and 24 of the 
Utah Constitution. The statute requires that the establishment 
of such a marriage be made within one year of the termination of 
the relationship. If the district court were to be reversed, the 
statute would deprive Mr. Hansen of due process, uniform 
operation of the laws, and his right to open courts because his 
rights would be extinguished by the one-year statute of 
limitations. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The statute in question in this case is Section 30-1-4.5, 
Utah Code Annotated (1995). This section provides: 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to 
this chapter shall be legal if a court or 
administrative order establishes that it arises 
out of a contract between two consenting parties 
who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a 
solemnized marriage under the provision of 
this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, 
and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have 
acquired a uniform and general reputation as 
husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage 
under this section must occur during the 
relationship described in Subsection (1), or 
within one year following the termination of that 
relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable 
under this section may be manifested in any form, 
and may fre proved under the Sflme general rules Qf 
evidence as facts in other cases. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1995)(emphasis added). 
If a court finds that a marriage arose out of a contract 
between two consenting parties who meet the above requirements, 
then in the eyes of the law, they are married. 
The following arguments address the findings and conclusions 
reached by the district court in the present case. The arguments 
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point out why the court incorrectly found the burden of proof for 
determining the existence of a common law marriage to be clear 
and convincing evidence, and why the statute authorizing common 
law marriage violates the Utah Constitution. 
POINT I. 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AS THE CORRECT STANDARD: THE 
GENERAL STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL ACTIONS, PROOF BY A 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, IS THE CORRECT STANDARD TO 
ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE. 
ZL. The general standard of proof in civil actions is proof bv a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
The district court concluded that the correct burden of 
proof for determining the existence of a common law marriage is 
proof by clear and convincing evidence. Record at 35 0. 
Although the language in Section 30-1-4.5(2) does not 
articulate the exact standard of proof required, it does require 
evidence be proved under "the same general rules of evidence as 
facts in other cases." According to the Utah Supreme Court, the 
general rules of evidence in Utah civil cases dictate that 
evidence be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. In Johns 
v. Shulsen. the Supreme Court explained, xx[i]t is universally 
recognized that the standard of proof required in civil actions 
is by a preponderance of the evidence." 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 
(Utah 1986) (citing Morris v. Farmer's Home Ins. Co.. 500 P.2d 
505 (Utah 1972)). 
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• i. - . - : • = - • - . ^ . y 
interpret the meaning of Section j0-i--*.5 'o apply a 
preponderance of the evidence standard *-h^ Montana Supreme Court 
--:_•£-:;-,. .. . ._:. determining that 
sucn corrr.rv;;. : : carriages are to be proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 1 In Miller v Townsend Lumber V
 : • - - • ? — -
! Ifiu Montana Supreme Coui . . ::erred to die Montana 
state common law marriage statute containing similar language to 
Utah's Section 30-i- ' ' • •'' ^ , | )'-n<^ > >t ,i a 
marriage "may be manifested ±n any form. a:.u may ue proved under 
the Liame general rules of evidence as facts in other ^ase? " Id. 
identical to m e language founc in Utah's statute, the Montana 
Supreme Court w^n*- ^ •-o apply- :j preponderance of the evidence 
.-3t.a:M^ : •: •••.:; :- -Aistence of a common law 
marriage.. j£L at 15 2. . . 
Based ~vi he ]nr:ai:i^ ~*.f q e c — --- "-" ••-} ; 
i . : -' _L*L- generaJ. IUI-CL; 01 cv^jciiCG d.s J. n ctiier cases, and 
based en the standard of proof required in Utah civil actions, 
the Court should have app1 .-• \ i ^ .-J-.:-. 
1
 The Utah statute reads; "Evidence of a marriage 
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any fuim, 
and may be proved under the same general rules of evidence as 
facts in other cases." Utah Code Ann. § 30 1-4.5(2) (1995). The 
Montana statute reads: "Consent to and consummation of marriage 
nay be manifested in any form, and may be proved,under the same 
general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. Cited in 
Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co.. 448 P. 2d 148, 1.51 (I^ onf , Q^i 
standard. 
ILu A majority of sister states which recognize common law 
marriage require proof by a preponderance of the evidence, 
While Utah's own statutes and cases have already outlined 
the appropriate burden of proof, the district court in the 
instant case relied on a survey of the law of sister states to 
determine the burden of proof necessary to establish a valid 
common law marriage. The district court's survey, however, was 
flawed. 
The district court found fourteen jurisdictions which have 
adopted a clear and convincing standard and nine jurisdictions 
which have adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Record at 241. However, there are only fifteen jurisdictions, 
including Utah, which recognize common law marriage, and only six 
of these states, including Utah, recognize common law marriage by 
statute.2 In its survey, the district court cited court 
decisions in states which have either abolished common law 
2
 Six states have statutes recognizing common law marriage, 
Montana, Texas, South Carolina, Idaho, Georgia and Utah. See 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-403 (1995); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91 
(Vernon, 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-360 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 32-
201 (1996)(recognizing marriages contracted before January 1, 
1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.1 (1996)(recognizing marriages 
contracted before January 1, 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 
(1995). Ten other jurisdictions judicially recognize common law 
marriage as part of the state's general common law. See Record 
at 241 (citing cases for Alabama, Oklahoma, Colorado, Iowa, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, District of Columbia, and South 
Dakota); Driscoll v. Driscoll. 552 P.2d 629, 632 -(Kan. 1976) 
(applying Kansas law). 
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man :i age and tl le cc: 1|!11 ' ^RTB • n n > 1 ,< i i i< * f < >rn n i ru les DI coi 11: ts 
which were applying trie law or other states . 
Tf * OTIV-TTQW
 0f other states ~ r* ""he or^oer method of 
detL.: :::.:.j i,^ appropriate burden oi proo; . states wiun common 
law marriage statutes similar to Utah's star.ute ought to be the 
proper ~* -• • * ^ -. 
recognize common law marriages by statute, lontana, Texas,. South 
Carolina Idal IC , and Georgia, all use a ± . eoonderanc? r4--.-.J_.: 
(•:. * ••• ether n:.,.
 ;.-riiidic;.iuLis which recou.nze common .i.aw 
marriage judicially- five (Alabama. Rhode '-land, Pennsylvania, 
Okl aii onia w, • . . t andar d. 
The other five states, which Like Utah recognize common law 
marriages hy sLatute ar" .iri^ -i-- < > : ; ;---r^-- £ 
the evidence standard Looking iu a±] liftmen states which 
recognize common ] aw marriage pi ther -nidi r-J -=>! ] y ^r b^ ~r atute , 
c i, I f ive appl '. • ,_-...-*: -...... , ^ignt Jir 
authority from sister states which recognize common law marriages 
is that the ar/": ->nri v -
preponderance or the evidence. 
£L' Public policy favors establishing a common law marriage 
using the preponderance of the evidence standards 
In coi 3 c::J iidi ng as a matter . - aw that ^ubi _, policy favored 
the establishment of common law marriages bv clear and convincing 
e v i d e n c e, t: h e d i s t r i z t: • :: :: i : • i: i -A -::< -* t o 
other civil judicial proceedings. The court stated that while 
most civil claims need only be proved by a preponderance, there 
are some exceptions: 
[T]he clear and convincing standard has been applied in 
the following types of civil proceedings, among others: 
civil commitment; termination of parental rights; civil 
contempt; denaturalization, and deportation. A common 
element in these civil proceedings is the presence of 
contested individual interest deemed worthy of extra 
protection. 
Record at 238(citations omitted). 
In comparing common law marriage to the judicial proceedings 
it listed, the district court found a common element of a 
"contested individual interest deemed worthy of extra 
protection," which justified a higher burden of proof. However, 
the proceedings that the district court compared common law 
marriage to are clearly distinguishable. 
The first civil proceeding to which the court compared 
common law marriage, civil commitment, demands the clear and 
convincing standard only because it is written into the statute. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-234 (10) (1997) ("The court shall order 
commitment of an individual... if... the court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that...."). 
Likewise, the termination of parental rights is governed by 
a statute defining the burden of proof as clear and convincing 
evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-406(3) (1996) ("The court 
shall in all cases require the petitioner to establish the facts 
by clear and convincing evidence..."). Because the standard is 
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w r i t " t " e n i n t v i I In 't a t u t e f* llhn i i n : o r p p i i i i n i ' i n iiiil ^ n o p a i i .il.i J e 
to the common ] aw marriage staiuce, which states that the 
requisite burden of proof required is "the same general rules of 
evidence as facts i n other cases." 
Civil contempt, another proceeding cited by the district 
coi 11: ' np-* 'V"1 -  ' :: • ::c n: u i: t :: i 1 1 a ; ; i: i: ibai: i: :i a - >- . I.^L. e 
because _' "onsidered "quasi-criminal," . ;.- equiring a 
higher standard than -- ntandnr^ civil proceeding Powers 
Taylor, . . - — u'o-i, . 
The other civil proceedings cited by "he court:, 
d e . . « . L- . . • . _ . . . . . . i . , ~ . : . M \ i 
common law marriage. In both cases, the standard of proof has 
been set down by *~h^  F*:i*-^ d States r.:ri-rv ' ' • • 
Denaturalizauiwix n^ ./, demanded a highei standard because a 
certificate of citizenship is "an instrumer- granting political 
. ~ : i - ni\eu ^apec^bi..; when 
uthe rights are conferred by solemn adjudication, as is the 
3ir'---!*-ic~ when "itizenshrr -' r--- ;. _i£rman. 2£ , UlliLM 
States, 1 1 Q .}~xt • . 'io revoKe citizenship is to 
rescind rights conferred by "solemn adjudi r it- ion, " Common law 
:
 • ' - - i: e s c :i i 1 d p o I i t i c a. 1 
privileges" previously conferred Joy d com ommon law marriage 
is merely the -vii ci al recocin' * - - ,c: i = i e] at::i onshi p 
There are no
 f.^iLical privileges" mvolvfa, i lor is there a 
reci.£*:cn or judicially conferred rights. 
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Likewise, deportation is also distinguishable from common 
law marriage. The United States Supreme Court has required a 
higher burden of proof in deportation matters because u[t]he 
immediate hardship of deportation is often greater than that 
inflicted by denaturalization, which does not, immediately at 
least, result in expulsion from our shores." Woodby v. 
Immigration Service 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966). Deportation forces 
the defendant to uforsake all the bonds formed here and go to a 
foreign land." Id. at 285. The finding of a common law marriage 
does not inflict the hardship envisioned by the Supreme Court 
when it required the clear and convincing standard for 
deportation. There, the heightened protection is warranted 
because of the heightened danger and hardships that can result 
from such proceedings. When that heightened danger is lacking, 
such as the case with common law marriage, public policy does not 
demand a higher standard of proof than the general standard of 
proof required in other civil matters. 
Because the standard of proof required in the proceedings 
cited by the district court are either defined by statute, by the 
United States Supreme Court, or seen by the courts as "quasi-
criminal" in nature, the proceedings cited by the district court 
are incorrect comparisons to common law marriage. Public policy 
does not require a higher standard of proof than the 
preponderance standard that governs other civil cases. 
The Hansens were once formally married. They^then divorced, 
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I: 1 it subsequent] '], ;i i: eti u : i led t: : ] :ii :i i l g togetil: ler ..-- , 
Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346 (Wyo. ±yvy), is 
helpful because i *- is fact1:^!!" similar. In than case the 
Wyoming Supreme L J U : L aadresseo trie issue c: wnether an employer 
could deny worker's compensation benefits ro a common law spouse 
had .iivorced ana :nen later resumed living Together. They did not 
formally remarry., Montana had a statute recoanizi rg common law 
marria^L . ^..-.-.^ i t^ oiau's statute. Tr its opinio.... the Wyoming 
Court stated rh-it the burden necessary m prove the elements of a 
/a - • - 'iJ^ader ai ..e 
evidence. Id. at U b O In so ruling, rhe -curt relied in part 
on % x "* -'-."f ; - -«!-;-
 OJL ^ strong rr"v.nTr* i I,"I\.MH nf I In • 
legalJ.Lj- . :• ... common-law marriage." Id. lis presumption and ' 
burden should apply in this case. 
Some z- :: i u : !::s = = i i :i i i s t a t e s d:i sfa ; ::)i: :i i l g :: :: mn i :: i :i ] a\ ? i: iai: i :i age, 
have relaxed the burden of proof required to prove the existence 
of ~* T:r~ion law marr: acr^ - - - " * •- < : 
ana men later resume jiVi.ii--. together, it*- Colorado Supreme 
Court, stated t;* i* ,l ' i 1 n s u c h a c a s e w e t h i r ^ t-ha*- t -he law / c= r o l e 
"i . • . > 
reversed and the status of remarriage favored,, even if acquired 
with common law *-* ' .. .„ Peterson's Estate, 3 65 1= 2d 
254, 256 (Colo, l^b ne Colorado Court later affirmed this 
ruling saying that it v'hoIds that the evidence in such cases may 
1 5 
be less than the positive and convincing proof necessary to 
establish a common law marriage." Ward v. Terriere, 3 86 P. 2d 
352, 355 (Colo. 1963). 
While it may be argued that common law marriage is 
disfavored in some states, in Utah the Legislature chose to 
recognize common law marriages in 1987. This recent recognition 
of common law marriages evidenced a shift in the light by which 
such marriages are to be seen. 
The language of the statute points the courts to the proper 
burden of proof required to show the existence of a common law 
marriage. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is the 
general burden of proof in civil matters and has been adopted by 
a majority of Utah's sister states that recognize common law 
marriage. 
POINT II. 
VIOLATION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION; UTAH CODE 1953 SECTION 30-1-
4.5(2), WHICH REQUIRES A DETERMINATION OF A COMMON LAW WITHIN ONE 
YEAR OF THE TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP VIOLATES ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS 7, 11, AND 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
A^ . Section 30-1-4.5(2) violates f.hft due process clause of 
Article 1. section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Section 30-1-4.5(2) provides xv[t]he determination or 
establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during 
the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year 
following the termination of that relationship.. . . " (Emphasis 
added). 
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T i I Ill .a .1 C o i i i : t : il: i \ ppeal s i las i i<: Dted 1 .1 2 potei it ::i a 1 
constiLuiional problems with Section. 30-1 4.5 The court stated: 
We do note, however, that [Section 30 -1-4.5] might 
present a constitutional questioi i i n a different 
context. If a trial court were to enter a judgement 
denying a common-law marriage within one year of 
separation, and that judgement were reversed on appeal 
and the matter remanded, the parties might be denied a 
reasonable opportunity to comply with the plain meaning 
of the statute. 
Bunch v. Englehori. — -^p. 1995) . 
As noted bv the district court., the present case presents 
: ... s set for th 
in the Addendum - ihis brief record at ^39. 
The Bunch ~~-urt recognd zed that the p ] a :i n mean i i lg of t:l I = 
statute is that the determination, not. simply a filing, must De 
made within one year of the • ^ rmination of the relationship.. Trr 
Bund. .i i 11::i f f p:i : oposec:i 1:1 Iat: she ::oi i: i|: 1 ied ; ; ith t:he statut:e 
by filing her complaint within one year of :ie parties' 
separation. 4 - v r r - • at d :: i l :: : e, 1 I Dwe^ ; ei: , :ii s 
contrary to its piain meaning. Under tne p a i n meaning of the 
statute, Bunch d i a -, nr nbtain a timely determination ^f her 
relcil j.onsIu.p -j-^-.- -' ,«*~L - *• • •'• — w i t h i n 
this context that the Court of Appeals noted the potential 
constitutional problems. 
Should Mr. Hansen obtain a favorable result on appeal, the 
statute would effect ivelv ^ r r ^ r p Mr. Hansen of a remedy since 
til le deter i ..* . ,. _ *_ „ ; nin one year,. It io possible 
1 7 
for him to prevail on appeal, reverse the trial court, and still 
lose the right to assert his claim. 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states, "[n]o person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." Utah Const. Art 1 § 7 (1896). 
The district court ruled that Mr. Hansen's constitutional 
challenge was premature because the appellate court had not yet 
reversed the trial court. Record at 338. However, by the time 
the trial court would find the constitutional issue relevant, Mr. 
Hansen would have already been deprived of his rights. 
Mr. Hansen has standing to immediately challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute even though it has not yet been 
applied to his detriment. Parties may challenge the validity of 
a statute if their interests have been or are "about to be 
prejudiced by the operation of the statute." Cavaness v. Cox. 
598 P.2d 349, 352 (Utah 1979) (citation omitted) . Should this 
court reverse the district court, it may rule that Mr. Hansen's 
interests are "about to be prejudiced" because it will be 
impossible for him to comply with the statute. The impending 
prejudice gives Mr. Hansen standing to challenge the statute. 
Under a literal reading of the statute as interpreted by the 
court in Bunchr the only way to comply with the statute's one-
year expiration clause would be to both file within one year of 
the termination and prevail at the district court level. If the 
party must appeal, regardless of a subsequent reversal, it will 
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a party must. .;^ it tor tne coun of appeals ro reverse, there is 
little chance of compliance with the statute. 
Mr Hansen's rights ought not be determined by the tact that 
trial and appellate courts have very busy schedules. See, e.g. 
E11 i S^L>—aocial jaejsdLcss-Jiesi^ oL Church-a L - Jesus Chris.L-of. 
Latter-Day Saints. 615 P.2d i250, 1256 (Utah 1980) (noting that 
when it is impossible to con: * ^ .*-- -!v/---. T1- ^ S 1" 
of the party, uue process requires chat her JJC permittee \ >u OUVJW 
that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity -n comply)-
application or statute to invalidate father's acknowledgment of 
paternity would vioiatp h:. . ••-r- ' * 4 ~ l ;.]--> 
have reasonable opportunity \o comply witn the statute, despite 
his fail ure to timely file an affidavit acknowledging patern: L^ , . 
Be ;...*• ;-.. . O-.L. , chance Lu comply 
with Section 50-1-4.5 12) as a result of the practical 
impossibiiit - " ^ ---*• the 
statute violator LIIC Due Process clause oi tlie Utah Const itut ion. 
BL. Section 30-1-4.5(2) violates the open courts provision of 
Article 1. section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
Se . 'nnsti tution states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of Jaw, 
which shall be administered without denial or 
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unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
state, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
Utah Const. Art 1 § 11 (1896). 
The analytical framework under which section 11 challenges 
are examined is a two step process. A court determines first, 
whether a statute removing an existing remedy provides an 
"effective and reasonable alternative remedy," and second, if no 
alternative remedy is provided, whether the statute eliminates a 
"clear social or economic evil" through means which are not 
unreasonable or arbitrary. See Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985); Condemarin v. 
University Hosp.. 775 P.2d 348, 358 (Utah 1989). 
The first prong of the test demands a reasonable alternative 
remedy because an attempt to "bar the existing rights of 
claimants without affording this opportunity [to try rights in 
the courts]...would not be a statute of limitations, but an 
unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might 
be the purport of its provisions." Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 
1357, 1365 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(citations omitted). 
If there is no substitute remedy, as in the case of section 
30-1-4.5(2), the statute must be justified by its elimination of 
a clear economic or social evil through a reasonable and non-
arbitrary means. Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. 
In this case, there is no alternative remedy provided by the 
20 
statute once a party has failed to meet the one-year provision. 
The question is then one of deterring clear social or economic 
evil. 
By restricting common law marriages to those which can be 
proven before a court within one year of termination of the 
relationship, the legislature has not deterred any clear social 
or economic evil. The statute also does away with the rights of 
a party seeking to establish a common law marriage through 
unreasonable and arbitrary means. 
This type of statute is what the court in Condemarin had in 
mind when it said: 
Legislative, attempts to abrogate [the special class of 
protected rights under article I, section 11] should be 
closely examined and struck down when the disability 
they seek to impose on individual rights is too great 
to be justified or when the legislation is an arbitrary 
and impermissible shifting of collective burdens to 
individual citizens. 
Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 358. 
£L. Section 30-1-4.5(2) violates the uniform operation provision 
of Article 1, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that xx [a] 11 
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.'7 Utah 
Const. Art 1 § 24 (1896). 
When evaluating a legislative measure under Section 24, a 
court must determine whether the classification is reasonable, 
whether the objectives of the legislature are legitimate, and 
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the 
21 
classification and the legislative purposes. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Utah v. Static 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). 
The practical effect of 30-1-4.5(2) is to limit those 
parties who may prove the existence of a common law marriage. As 
previously noted, the only means by which one may comply with the 
statute is to file a Complaint within one year of the termination 
of the relationship and prevail at the trial court level, and 
complete all administrative requirements to have the judgement 
entered by the court. 
If the party must appeal, there is little chance of 
complying with the one-year restriction of the statute. These 
parties are without remedy and are unreasonably classified 
differently from those who may prevail at the trial court. This 
unreasonable classification violates Section 24 as interpreted by 
Blue Cross. 779 P.2d at 637. 
CONCLUSION 
The inquiry into the existence of a common law marriage is 
made under Section 30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code. The legislature did 
not explicitly express the burden of proof required beyond 
stating that the evidence should be proved "under the same 
general rules of evidence as facts in other cases." Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1995). Those general rules include the 
general burden of proof in civil matters, proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. When read literally, the statute 
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itself provides the burden of proof necessary. The district 
court incorrectly applied the higher standard of clear and 
convincing evidence. This Court should reverse and restate the 
correct burden of proof for determining the existence of a common 
law marriage under Utah law: proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
Beyond a literal reading of the statute, a survey of sister 
states with similar common law marriage statutes to Utah's 
statute shows that the weight of judicial authority is that proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence is the correct standard. 
The statute itself is unconstitutional when the facts of 
this case are applied to its provisions. As the district court 
noted, the hypothetical constitutional problems envisioned by the 
court in Bunch v. Englehorn. 906 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), 
are realized in the present case. If the district court is 
reversed, Mr. Hansen will be deprived of due process because of 
his inability to comply with the one-year requirement of the 
statute. Mr. Hansen will also be deprived of his rights under 
the open courts provision in Section 11 of the Utah Constitution 
because there is no reasonable alternative remedy provided and 
the statute fails to eliminate a clear social or economic evil 
through means that are not unreasonable or arbitrary. Through an 
unreasonable classification of those that are unable to comply 
with the one-year provision, Section 30-1-4.5(2) violates the 
uniform operation clause of the Utah Constitution. 
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Accordingly, it is requested that the Court rule on all 
issues presented and hold as a matter of law that the correct 
standard required to establish a common law marriage is proof by 
a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, this Court may 
declare Section 30-1-4.5(2) unconstitutional. 
Dated this o day of August, 1997. 
Brent D. Ypungc 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
24 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this f day of August, 1997, 
I caused to be mailed, first-class mail, postage prepaid, 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant to ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee, addressed as follows: 
ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS, 
853 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
L.L.C. 
BRENT D. 
25 
ADDENDUM 
Section 30-1-4.5 Utah Code Ann. (1995) 
Utah Constitution Art 1 § 7 (1896) 
Utah Constitution Art 1 § 11 (1896) 
Utah Constitution Art 1 § 24 (1896) 
Ruling, December 20, 1996 (Record at 229-247) 
Ruling, April 14, 1997 (Record at 337-339) 
Bunch y, Bnglehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah ct. App. 1995) 
Miller v, TQwnsend Lumber Co., 448 P.2d 148 (Mont. 
1968) 
Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs. 590 P.2d 1346 (Wyo. 1979) 
In re Peterson's Estate. 365 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1961) 
I 
A. Section 30-1-4.5 Utah Code Ann. (1995) 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this 
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative 
crcier establishes that it arises out of a contract between two 
consenting parties who: 
(aj are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized mar-
riage under the provisions of this chapter; 
(c* have cohabited: 
(d mutually assume maritai rights, duties, and obliga-
tions; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a 
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage un-
der this section must occur during the relationship described 
in Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination 
of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable 
under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be 
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in 
other cases. 1987 
B. Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n Art 1 § 7 (1896) 
Art. I, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.: 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus $ 5. 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Constitutional Law 
Sec- 6- [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const. 1896: L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.R. 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2. proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3. Laws 1984 (2nd S . S J . § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur . 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2. 
A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law s=» 82; 
Weapons ®=» 1. 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
64 
C. Utah Constitution Art 1 § 11 (1896) 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § 11 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 177. 
Am, J U T . 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 7 et 
sea.. 
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries § 9 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated or simi-
lar offense, right to trial by jury in criminal 
prosecution for, 16 A.L.R.3d 1373. 
Right in equity suit to jury trial of counter-
claim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321. 
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or 
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393. 
Automobiles: validity and construction of 
legislation authorizing revocation or suspen-
sion of operator's license for "habitual/ ' "per-
sistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic reg-
ulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial. 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 
A.L.R.4th 565. 
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory 
discharge from employment. 52 A.L.R.4th 
1141. 
Right to jury trial in state court divorce pro-
ceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955. 
Jury trial rights in, and on appeal from, 
small claims court proceeding, 70 A.L.R.4th 
1119. 
Key Numbers . — Jury <s=> 9 et seq. 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be' administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
History: Const. 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Actions by court. 
Actions by state. 
Actions not created. 
Arbitration Act. 
Assignments. 
Attorneys' duties. 
Criminal law. 
—Suspension of execution of death sentence. 
Debt collection. 
District court jurisdiction. 
Election contest. 
Forum non conveniens. 
Injury or damage to property. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Land Registration Act. 
Limitations. 
—Limitations of actions. 
—Statutory limitation of review. . 
Occupational disease law. 
Sovereign immunity. 
Torts. 
—Action by wife against husband. 
—Loss of consortium. 
Unlicensed law practice. 
Waiver of rights. 
Workmen's compensation law. 
Cited. 
Action u n d e r Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C. 1981 et 
seq., is vested originally in the federal courts, 
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by 
state courts is not thereby prohibited; in view 
of the provisions of this section, therefore, it 
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 
625 (Utah 1977). 
Trial court would not err in dismissing ac-
tion brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the 
ground of forum non conveniens in a proper 
case, but such dismissal should be without 
prejudice so that the plaintiff might move his 
suit to another forum without harm to his 
claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 
1977). 
Actions by court. 
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open pro-
bate proceeding and to proceed against bond of 
administratrix where she has practiced extrin-
sic fraud on the court. Wevant v. Utah Saw & 
Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.L.R. 
1119 (1919). 
Actions by state. 
This section did not alter the law with re-
spect to certain rights which are vested in the 
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D. Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n Art 1 § 24 (1896) 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § 24 
project did not unconstitutionally grant bene-
fits to private individuals; any benefits were 
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-
mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. 
§§ 9 to 23. 
36 Am. Jur . 2d Franchises C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26. 
Kev Numbers. — Franchises <$= 11. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-
vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
26. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Age of majority. 
Agent for service of process. 
Automobile license law. 
Construction with Art. VI, § 26. 
Contract carrier permit. 
Cosmetologists' license law. 
Criminal actions. 
—Investigations. 
—Prosecution. 
—Sentence. 
Criminal sentence. 
Disparate tax assessments. 
Excess revenue refuncs. 
Guest statutes. 
Inheritance Tax Law. 
Insurance premium tax exemption. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Licenses. 
Massage parlor ordinance. 
Municipal employment prerequisites. 
Notice requirements. 
Propert y. 
—Responsibility for water service. 
Public employees' retirement system. 
Public officers' bonds. 
Public officers' salaries. 
Road poll tax. 
School activities. 
Search warrants. 
Sunday closing laws. 
Tax sales. 
Unfair Practices Act. 
In genera l . 
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever 
uniform laws can be enacted. State v. 
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563. 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 
696 (1921). 
Objects and purposes of law present touch-
stone for determining proper and improper 
classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 
P.2d 920. 117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. & 
R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 
(1941). 
One who assails legislative classification as 
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such. 
State v.* J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Classification is never unreasonable or arbi-
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features so 
long as there is some basis for differentiation 
between classes or subject matters included, as 
compared to those excluded, provided differen-
tiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of 
act. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker. Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Before legislative enactment can be inter-
fered with, court must be able to say that there 
is no fair reason for the law that would not 
require equally its extension to those which it 
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc.. 100 Utah 523. 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Only where some persons or transactions ex-
cluded from operation of law are, as to the sub-
ject matter of the law, in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation, is the law 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary 
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis 
to differentiate can be found, law must be held 
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523. 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Inability of legislature to make perfect clas-
sification does not render statute unconstitu-
tional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc.. 100 
Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
In determining whether classification made 
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimina-
tion is very essence of classification and is not 
objectionable unless founded upon- unreason-
able distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake Citv, 
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948). 
An act is never unconstitutional because of 
123 
E. Ruling, December 20, 1996 (Record at 229-247) 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
t ^ d i _ j £ i ^ Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL L. HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAURA T. HANSEN, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 954402169 
DATED: DECEMBER 20, 1996 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFTELD, JUDGE 
Trial on plaintiffs complaint for determination of a common law marriage was 
held October 24, 1996 and was continued on October 26, 1996. At trial the Court also 
heard evidence on an order to show cause issued at the request of plaintiff. Brent 
Young represented plaintiff Michael Hansen ("Mike"), and Andrew McCullough 
represented defendant, Laura Hansen ("Laura"). Closing arguments were heard on 
November 27, 1996. Kelly Frye, guardian ad litem, was present and participated in 
both proceedings. At issue is whether the parties' relationship constitutes a common 
law marriage and contempt allegations claimed by each party against the other. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I find that the following facts have been proven by clear and convincing 
evidence: 
1. These parties previously were married for a period of approximately 
1 
nine years. Their divorce was final in March 1994. 
2. In October 1994 Mike moved back into the former marital home with 
Laura and resided there with her and the children of the parties until at least May 
1995. 
3. From May 1995 through September 22, 1995 Mike did not live at 
Laura's home nor cohabit with her. 
4. Judge Hansen previously made a finding in a protective order action 
between these parties that Mike lived in Laura's home at her request from September 
22, 1995, through December 27, 1995. 
5. During the periods of cohabitation Mike routinely turned over his 
paycheck to Laura and then received back some cash as "walking around money." 
6. During the periods of cohabitation Laura worked and she pooled her 
money with the money which she received from Mike. 
7. Laura used the money she and Mike earned to pay the significant credit 
card debt which Mike had incurred during the period of separation preceding their 
divorce, to pay the home mortgage, to pay family living expenses and obligations and 
to pay her debts. 
8. During the period of cohabitation the parties acted much like a family. 
9. When the parties' son was of age to be baptized the parties met with the 
local L.D.S. Bishop to arrange for the son's baptism. In the process neither party 
dispelled the appearance that they were a family. 
10. After Mike moved back in with Laura the membership clerk from the 
2 
L.D.S. Church came to visit to inquire concerning Mike's church membership records 
and was told that Mike lived in the marital home. The appearance was that he and 
Laura were back together. 
11. During the periods of cohabitation the parties spent time with several 
family friends, including going on trips, like one particular Lake Powell trip. During 
all of those trips the parties did not refer to each other as husband or wife. 
12. The friends who knew the parties best believed that the parties were 
living together as a couple but not as husband and wife. 
13. During the period of cohabitation Laura had an intimate relationship 
with one of these friends, contradicting any notion that she was married to Mike, 
although he was living in the marital home. 
14. Laura used Mike's medical and dental insurance to cover the cost of 
some of her medical treatments. This insurance coverage was claimed by her as 
Mike's wife. The coverage was only available to her as a wife and she claimed the 
benefit of that coverage. 
15. During the time the parties cohabited Laura held herself out as Mike's 
wife to the insurance carrier. 
16. During the time the parties cohabited each was capable of giving 
consent to a marriage and each was legally capable of entering into a solemnized 
marriage. 
17. During the time the parties cohabited they each assumed marital rights, 
duties and obligations. 
3 
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18. During the period of cohabitation Laura frequently wore a ring on the 
finger of her left hand traditionally viewed as her marriage finger. 
19. During the period of cohabitation Laura admitted to Mike that she felt 
he had received an inequitable distribution in the divorce. She agreed with him that if 
the parties subsequently separated that each would be entitled to one-half of the equity 
in the home. 
20. On several occasions during the period of cohabitation Mike told Laura 
that he wanted to be married to her and asked her to remarry him. On each of those 
occasions Laura declined to enter into a new marriage with Mike. 
21. The parties filed separate tax returns for 1994 and 1995. 
22. The complaint in this case was filed on October 12, 1995, during the 
course of the cohabitation and alleged common law marriage of the parties. 
23. Each of the parties have violated terms of one or more orders of the 
Court. 
24. This Court previously entered a mutual protective order limiting contact 
between the parties and specifically restraining any harassing or threatening behavior. 
In defiance of that order Laura has struck Mike and Mike has spit on Laura. 
25. Further, Laura has entered into a pattern of baiting Mike. On one 
recent occasion she arranged visitation for Mike. When he came to pick up the 
children with a third-party witness they saw the children enter the home but no one 
would answer the door when the third party knocked. Mike then went with the third 
party to a phone and the friend called Laura. A police officer was on the other end of 
4 
the phone and he asserted that Mike had violated the protective order Then the 
officer found out it was not Mike on the phone This pattern of conduct constitutes 
baiting by Laura of Mike in an effort to get him in trouble with the courts for 
violating protective orders 
26 Laura also has made complaints to law enforcement at times when she 
knew that protective orders have been dismissed by the Court. 
27 Laura has denied visitation when there has been a clear, detailed, 
wntten order setting forth the visitation schedule For example, she denied Mike his 
UEA visitation with Zeb 
28. At least some of Laura's denials of visitation to Mike have been made 
in response to rulings by the Court that went against Mike. 
29. Almost all of the actions of Mike and Laura in each violating the orders 
of the Court, in harassing each other, in involving the police and in fighting and 
spitting at each other, have been witnessed by the children. That alone is grounds for 
a stem response by the Court as the children have been significantly impacted by the 
continual fighting of the parents 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
L COMMON LAW MARRIAGE 
EVIDENTIARY BURDEN BORN BY PLAINTIFF. 
In cases seeking the determination of a common law marriage I previously 
have ruled that the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the existence of the 
common law marriage by clear and convincing evidence. As that is the evidentiary 
5 
standard which I apply m this case, I offer this explananon of the legal analysis for the 
use of that evidentiary standard 
A. Background: Common-law marriage generally is disfavored 
For nearly a century before the enactment of Utah Code Ann § 30-1-4 5 in 
April of 1987, Utah courts consistently refused to validate common-law marriages ! 
Legal recognition of common-law marriage apparently was precipitated by the 
legislature's desire to curb abuse of welfare programs : Thus, one cannot assume that 
the State's recognition of common-law marriages reflects approval of them Such 
recognition runs counter to the national trend of abohsning the doctrine 3 Although 
Idaho itself continues to recognize common-law marriages, the Idaho Supreme Court, 
in Metropolitan Life Ins v Johnson. 645 P 2d 356, 359-60 (Idaho 1982), noted that 
common-law marriage increasingly is disfavored in other junsdictions 
The trend toward abolition of common law marriage indicates an obvious 
hostility to the doctrine That hostility is not confined to those states which do 
not recognize common law marriages. The courts of many junsdictions 
recognizing the doctnne also view it with disfavor Texas Employers' Ins 
Ass'n v Elder. 274 S W 2d 144, 147 (Civ App 1954) ("the law does not favor, 
but merely tolerates, common law mamages ") affd 155 Tex 27, 282 S W 2d 
371 (1955), In re Redman's Estate. 135 Ohio St 554, 21 NE2d 659, 661 
xSee David F Crabtree, Development, Recognition of Common Law Mamages. 149 
Utah L Rev 273, 275 (1988) (discussing the legislature's enactment of Utah Code Ann § 30-
1-4 5) 
Id. at 280-81 
3Crabtree, writing in 1988, stated that common-law marnage was then recognized in 
the following junsdictions Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and the Distnct of Columbia. 
Id at 276 n 15 Since that time, at least one of these junsdictions (Ohio) has abolished the 
doctnne See In re Estate of Shepherd. 646 NE 2d 561, 563 (Ohio App d Deist 1994) 
(stating that Ohio abolished common-law marnage in 1991) 
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(1939) ("So-called common law marriage contravenes public policy and should 
not be accorded any favor; indeed, it is quite generally condemned.,"); Baker 
v.Mitchell. 143 Pa. Super. 50, 17 A-2d 738, 741 (1941) ("The law of 
Pennsylvania recognizes common law marriages. But they are a fruitful source 
of perjury and fraud, and in consequence, they are to be tolerated, not 
encouraged") 
B. An apparent majority of jurisdictions require that common-law 
marriage claims be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
The distrust with which common-law marriage is viewed in most jurisdictions 
finds expression in the higher evidentiary standard many of them in pose on litigants 
seeking to prove the existence of such marriages. Research of case law from other 
jurisdictions indicates that at least fourteen have adopted a clear and convincing 
standard of proof. Alabama (Crawford v. State. 629 So.2d 745, 748 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1993)); Ohio (Mullins v. Mullins. 590 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Ohio App. 3d Dist. 1990)); 
Oklahoma (Mueggenborg v. Walling. 836 P.2d 112, 114 (okla. 1992); Connecticut 
(Collier v. City of Milford. 537 A.2d 474, 479 (Conn. 1988)); Rhode Island (Souza v. 
O'Hara. 395 A.2d 1060, 1061 n.2 (R.I. 1982)); Michigan (In re Leonard's Estate. 207 
N.W.2d 166, 168 (Mich. App. 1973)); Indiana (In re DeWitte's Estate. 222 N.E. 2d 
285, 291 (Ind. App. 1966)); Pennsylvania (In re Estate of Miller. 448 A.2d 25, 38 
(Penn. Super. Ct. 1982)); Florida (In re Estate of McClenahan. 476 So.2d 1289, 1292 
(Fla. App. 2d Dist. 1985, rev, denied. 486 So.2d 597)); Nebraska (Binger v. Binger. 63 
N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1954)); South Dakota (Seger v. Erickson. 64 N.W. 2d 316, 
318 (S.D. 1954)); New Jersey (In re Jacobsen's Estate. 39 A.2d 704, 707 (N.J. Surr. 
Ct. 1994)); Mississippi (Paschall v. Polk. 379 So.2d 316, 317 (Miss. 1980)); and New 
York (In re Arbuthonot's Estate. 157 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714 (Surr. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1956, 
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affd. 6 A.2d 1048)).4 
By contrast, the same research revealed only nine jurisdictions that have 
adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard: Georgia (Arnold v. State. 247 S.E. 
2d 207, 208 (Ga. App. 1978)); Texas (Richardson v. State. 744 S.W.2d 65, 73 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1987)); South Carolina (Yarborough v. Yarborough. 314 S.E.2d 16, 18-19 
(S.C. App. 1984)); Louisiana (Bloom v. Willis. 60 So.2d 415, 417 (La. 1952)); West 
Virginia (In re Estate of Foster. 376 S.E.2d 144, 150 (W. Va. 1988)); District of 
Columbia (Murphv v. McCloud. 650 A.2d 202, 211-12 (D.C. App. 1994); Montana 
(Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co.. 448 P.2d 148, 151 (Mont. 1968)); Arkansas (Brissett 
v. Svkes. 855 S.W. 2d 330, 332 (Ark. 1993)); and Idaho (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 
645 P.2d at 360)). Thus, the weight of judicial authority appears to favor imposition 
of the higher standard of proof. 
C Public policy favors imposing a clear and convincing standard of proof. 
Regardless of the number of jurisdictions favoring one standard over the other, 
4In addition, although Iowa requires that unsolemnized marriages be proved by 
a preponderance of the evidence, such claims are subject to heightened scrutiny. See 
Matter of Estate of Stodola. 519 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Iowa App. 1994) (Unsolemnized 
marriages must be proved by a "preponderance of clear, consistent, and convincing 
evidence"); In re Marriage of Winegard. 257 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Iowa 1977) (Claims 
are to be "closely scrutinized and regarded with suspicion"). 
Colorado has been cited as having imposed the clear and convincing standard 
of proof. See Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n. 234 P.2d 901, 903 
(Colo. 1951) (Evidence of unsolemnized marriage should be "clear, consistent and 
convincing"). However, in People v. Lucero. 747 P.2d 660, 664 n.6 (Colo. 1988), the 
Colorado Supreme Court explained that "[tjhis language was not chosen in order to 
establish a higher burden of proof for those attempting to prove a common law 
marriage, but instead merely stresses that the parties must be present more than vague 
claims unsupported by competent evidence." 
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there are persuasive reasons for adopting the clear and convincing standard in Utah. 
Among them is the need to establish with certainty legal rights and obligations that 
derive from the legal status of marriage. Such rights and obligations may be at stake 
in the context of divorce, estate distribution, assertion of evidentiary privileges, and 
survivors' claims for various forms of public assistance. Solemnized marriages are 
thought to define such rights with a degree of certainty not characteristic of 
unsolemnized, unrecorded marriages.5 As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, the fact 
that persons possessing no clear legal record of marriage can assert claims to such 
rights as common-law spouses creates a potential for fraud, especially where the 
claimant stands to gain financially.6 Imposition of a high standard of proof minimizes 
the risk of fraud be requiring claimants to establish the existence of such marriages 
with a high degree of definiteness. 
5In In re Veta's Estate. 170 P.2d 183, 186 (Utah 1946), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
The purpose of enactments requiring the solemnization of marriage 
before an authorized person, together with those dealing with the prior 
procurement of a license, is doubtless to protect the parties to the marriage 
contract in the rights flowing therefrom, and likewise to protect their offspring. 
A solemn record of the contract is made to which recourse may be had when 
rights or obligations of the husband or wife arising from the marriage are in 
issue. So, too, are the interests of third parties in dealing with either of the 
contracting parties, subsequent to the marriage, thus protected. 
6In Whvte v. Blair. 885 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1995), the court stated: 
Care must given to guard against fraudulent marriage claims, especially 
where a declaration of marriage would reap financial rewards for an 
alleged spouse. When a reward is available, human nature may choose 
to strengthen and augment, in retrospect, the consent to marry that was 
only tentative before the reward became available/ (citations omitted) 
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There is support in other areas of the law for the higher standard of proof 
Although most civil claims need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence,7 
the clear and convincing standard has been applied in the following types of civil 
proceedings, among others civil commitment (State v Drobel. 815 P2d 724, 728 n 5 
(Utah App 1991)), termination of parental rights (Woodward v Fazzio. 823 P 2d 474, 
477 (Utah App 1991)), civil contempt (State v Drobel. 815 P 2d 724 (Utah App 
1991), denaturalization (Chaunt v United States. 364 US 350 (I960)), and 
deportation (Woodbv v INS, 385 US 276 (1966)) A common element in these civil 
proceedings is the presence of contested individual interests deemed worthy of extra 
protection Given the seriousness of the rights and obligations that derive from 
marriage and the importance traditionally accorded to mamage by our legal system,8 is 
reasonable to require those seeking to prove common-law marriages to do so by the 
same standard used to determine other interests of substantial importance 
7Maxfield v Denver & no Grande Western RR Co. 330 P 2d 1018, 1021 
(Utah 1958) 
8See Norton v MacFarlane. 818 P 2d 8, 18 (Utah 1991), where Justice Howe 
in concurrence and dissent, stated 
While marriage is m one sense a private contract between the parties, it 
is also a relationship in which the state is vitally interested and, because 
of such interest, the law attaches thereto certain rights and duties, 
irrespective of the wishes of the parties Mamage is in its nature a 
permanent status and has been properly referred to as the most 
important of all civil relations (citation omitted) 
See also. Crawford v State. 629 So 2d 745, 758 (Ala. Cr App 1993) ("[D]ue 
to the serious nature of the marriage relationship, the courts will closely scrutinize a 
claim of common-law mamage and require clear and convincing pjpof thereof,f) 
10 
D. The benefits of imposing a clear and convincing standard of proof 
outweigh its disadvantages. 
Arguments can be made in favor of imposing a lower standard of proof. One 
such argument might be that the higher standard prejudices cohabitants who live for 
long periods of time as though married but then find themselves unable to establish 
entitlement to benefits reserved for lawful spouses Upon termination of common-law 
marriage by death or separation, this problem could arise in the context of claims for 
government benefits for surviving spouses,9 or in connection with claims for spousal 
support. In addition, some jurisdictions have concluded that it is appropriate to 
presume valid marriage, instead of cohabitation, as a matter of moral principle 10 
Finally it could be argued that imposing the higher standard of proof may make it 
more difficult for the State to prove welfare fraud under the statue. 
These arguments, though not without merit, are not persuasive Although the 
clear and convincing standard may make it more difficult for persons who live in 
genuine common-law marriages to claim benefits reserved for legal spouses, it should 
have the concomitant effect of making it more difficult to claim such benefits 
fraudulently Obviously, the public has an interest m minimizing fraud with respect to 
9Crabtree, supra, at 275, has stated that "[o]ne context for the refusal to 
recognize common-law marriage, and the most inequitable consequence of that policy, 
has been the denial of workers' compensation benefits to spousal equivalents of 
deceased employees. With few exceptions, cohabitants have consistently been denied 
any benefits afforded a legally marriage spouse." 
10See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co . 645 P.2d at 361 (stating that in Idaho "the 
law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and no concubinage; legitimacy, 
and not bastardy, every intendment of the law leans to matrimony."). 
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publicly financed benefit programs. Given the ease with which solemnized marriage 
may be obtained, society's interest in reducing fraud outweighs the prejudice to the 
minority of persons which chooses to rely upon the traditionally disfavored doctrine of 
common-law marriage. 
Whether the law as a matter of principle should favor finding unsolemnized 
marriages where possible instead of cohabitation alone is debatable; the legislature has 
not expressed approval of this position. Again, there seems little reason to accord 
favor to unsolemnized marriage when solemnized marriage is readily available. As 
concerns the potennally diminished ability of the State to use the common-law 
marriage statue to reduce welfare fraud, whatever disadvantage this may produce 
should be offset by the State's enhanced ability to defend against fraudulent claims to 
benefits for which eligibility is dependent upon lawful marriage. 
E. Conclusion. 
Because of the importance of legal rights and obligations deriving from 
marriage, the need to establish these rights and obligations with certainty, and the 
potential for fraud inherent in claims based upon common-law marriage, it is 
appropriate to require that such claims be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
THE FACTORS WHICH PLAINTIFF MUST PROVE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 sets forth the following factors which must be 
established in order for the Court to find the existence of a common law marriage: 
The claimed common law marriage must arise out of a contract between two 
consenting parties who: 
12 
1) are capable of giving consent, 
2) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provisions of this chapter, 
3) have cohabited, 
4) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations, and 
5) hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife 
By clear and convincing evidence the facts bear out that both parties are and 
were capable of giving consent, that they are and were capable of entering a 
solemnized marriage under the provisions of law, that they cohabited, and that they 
mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and obligations I spend little further time 
with those issues What remains, therefore is whether they held themselves out as and 
have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife and whether they 
consented to a common law marital contract 
Whether the parties held themselves out as husband and wife is a fact sensitive 
question In this case the more persuasive evidence is that for a time they did hold 
themselves out as husband and wife When she used insurance forms to claim medical 
benefits for herself from Mike's insurance earner Laura was holding herself out as 
Mike's wife When they were visited in the home by the membership clerk of their 
local church unit regarding Mike's status m the ward and when they took their son to a 
local church leader to prepare the son for baptism in their church they each held 
themselves out as husband and wife Finally, for a time Laura wore a ring on the 
13 
0235 
finger of her left hand traditionally viewed as the marriage finger. I conclude that for 
a time Mike and Laura held themselves out as husband and wife.11 
While they may have held themselves out as husband and wife, the statute also 
requires that they acquire a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. This 
did not happen. 
Several of Mike's witnesses testified that they were friends of the parties and 
frequently visited with the parties in the residence during the period of cohabitation. 
These witnesses testified that they viewed the parties as a couple but never viewed the 
couple as married. In other words, in the home where the parties were residing they 
were not viewed by their most intimate friends as a married couple. Yet these were 
the friends of the parties, those who knew them best. If they did not view Mike and 
Laura as husband and wife, one well may wonder who did view them as husband and 
wife. Because among their closest associates they did not have a uniform reputation 
as husband and wife it is impossible for me to conclude that Mike has carried his 
burden on this issue by clear and convincing evidence.12 
11
 It is appropriate in this context to look to the motivations of the parties. Laura asserts 
now that there was no common law marriage. She has a financial incentive to avoid a 
common law marriage-she wants to keep the home free of any claim by Mike. At the same 
time Mike has a financial incentive to establish a common law marriage—he wants to establish 
an interest in the home. Each of these appear offsetting. On the other hand, Laura had a 
direct financial incentive at the time she represented to the insurance provider that she was 
Mike's wife—she wanted her medical bills paid by an insurance carrier which owed her no 
legal duty. In that setting she held herself out as Mike's wife. 
12
 To Mike's apparent surprise at trial, one of his witnesses admitted to an intimate 
relationship with Laura during the time she was cohabiting with Michael. Obviously Laura's 
participation in such a relationship indicates that she did not consider her relationship with 
Mike to be of sufficient strength to avoid a different, entangling relationship. More 
importandy, however, none of these witnesses viewed the parties as husband and wife. 
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Not only does Mike fail to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the 
parties acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife, he has failed to 
establish that each party consented to a common law marriage relationship. 
In this case there is no single, clear fact demonstrating that Laura consented to 
a common law marital contract. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. On several 
occasions Mike asked Laura to marry him. Each time she refused. That she rejected 
his several proposals is evidence that she had not consented to a marital relationship. 
While consent must be established, as noted by the Supreme Court in Whvte v 
Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 794, n. 3 (Utah 1994), mutual consent can be shown by 
acquiescence. The facts establish that for her own financial benefit Laura 
affirmatively held herself out to the insurance company as Mike's wife. To avoid 
embarrassment she held herself out to the church representatives as Mike's wife. For a 
time she wore a ring on her marriage finger. For several months she allowed Mike to 
live in the home, enjoying a conjugal relationship and sharing family expenses. All of 
these demonstrate some measure of acquiescence by her in the existence of a marital 
relationship. On the other hand, that acquiescence is overcome by her own continued 
insistence that the parties not remarry. She knowingly chose not to accept Mike's 
marriage proposals. That evidence, which is clear and convincing, offsets any alleged 
acquiescence in a marital relationship. Laura knew Mike wanted to remarry and 
repeatedly declined. Rather than evidencing consent, this evidences just the opposite, 
an insistent lack of consent. 
Finally, a word about the inequity in the prior divorce decree. During the 
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period of cohabitation at issue now Laura admitted to Mike and to third parnes that 
Mike had not received a fair share of the equity of the home in the divorce That she 
acknowledged that inequity but did nothing meaningful to remedy the inequity, such as 
remarrying or transferring an interest to Mike, speaks against Mike's claim that Laura 
acquiesced in the marriage Had she acquiesced in a mantal relationship it is likely 
she would have taken some affirmative action to remedy the inequity Instead, she 
maintained some continued distance between each of their financial situations as she 
did not remedy the inequity by transfers of property and she declined to join in any 
joint tax returns. 
While I am troubled by the inequity that Laura acknowledges existed following 
the divorce, I do not have the discretion to find a common law marriage in a case 
where the facts do not warrant that conclusion. 
In determining whether a relationship satisfies the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-l-4.5(l)(a) through (e), numerous factors should be considered. No 
single factor is determinative. See People v Lucero. 747 P.2d 660, 665 (Colo. 
1987) (en banc). Evidence of each element is essential. Consennng parties must 
show cohabitation, assumption of mantal rights and duties, a general reputation 
as husband and wife, capacity to marry, and capacity to give consent. 
Whvte v Blair, supra, at (emphasis added). 
Taking all of this evidence together, I find that Mike has failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence either that Laura consented to a mantal relationship or 
that the parties acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. Mike's 
complaint for the determination of a common law marriage must be dismissed. 
H. CONTEMPT. 
Both parties have alleged the other is in contempt of existing orders of the 
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court by their continual harassing actions during and surrounding visitation. In that 
claim each is correct. Each of the parties have acted contemptibly in the way that 
they have dealt with the other during the necessary interactions between them arising 
from their being co-parents of two children. Obviously they have developed a 
worthless bitterness between them that has fueled actions which are both obnoxious 
and in contempt of the orders of the court. Each party merits sanction by the Court. 
I have strong feelings about the extent of Laura's contempt. She has 
discounted the extent of her contempt by pointing an accusatory finger at Mike for his 
claimed or actual violations of the protective orders issued by the Court. She has 
feigned innocence. Yet the record is clear that she has baited Mike in an effort to 
cause him continuing problems with the criminal courts and frequently she has exacted 
her own punitive response against Mike when she has not liked the result of Court 
rulings. While she asserts excuse, those excuses are without merit. What she did is 
impose her own rules on Mike's visitation in violation of the direct orders of the court. 
She is in contempt of the Court. 
Upon reaching the conclusion that Laura is in contempt of court, and believing 
that the sting of either a fine or a jail sentence for Laura may fall most heavily on the 
children, I had intended to take away essentially all of Laura's Christmas vacation 
visitation in order to make clear to her that she, too, has been in open violation of the 
orders of the Court. Since reaching that conclusion I have received a detailed report 
by the guardian ad litem which addresses a claimed action by Mike which places in 
question his continued unsupervised visitation of the children. That matter is set for 
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hearing on Monday, December 23, 1996. As a result, I decline today to impose any 
sanction on either Mike or Laura for their contempt of the court's orders, but will wait 
until the conclusion of the December 23, 1996 hearing to impose the sanctions which 
seem appropriate. Each must know, however, that a sanction is forthcoming. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Laura's counsel 
is directed to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment of dismissal 
of Mike's common law marriage claim. 
Dated this —^' day of December, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
ANTHONY ,W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
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Pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, this matter is 
before the Court on plaintiffs motion to amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Having considered the memoranda of counsel, I deny the motion to amend, 
concluding as I previously did, that the correct burden of proof is proof by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Plaintiff also raises a constitutional argument. He is correct in his analysis that 
his case has the potential to present the very case identified by example in the opinion 
in Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918, 921, n. 3 (Utah App. 1995), where the Court 
said: 
We do note, however, that [Section 30-1-4.5] might present a 
constitutional question in a different context. If a trial court were to 
enter a judgment denying a common-law marriage within one year of 
separation, and that judgment were reversed on appeal and the matter 
remanded, the parties might be denied a reasonable opportunity to 
comply with the plain meaning of the statute. 
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This constitutional argument is premature as there is no assurance that on 
appeal the appellate courts will reverse the trial court judgment. If they do and do not 
address the constitutional argument in their reversal, then the issue of the constitutional 
argument will be ripe for consideration. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, defendant's 
counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
A 
Dated this J x day of April, 1997. 
BY THE CO\JRT^\^ji}^^ 
2 
G. Bunch v. Enalehorn. 906 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
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only those circumstances affecting the best 
interests of the children or the public can be 
considered. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a—47 
(1992). The juvenile court concluded that 
the children's best interests would be served 
by denying the father's petition and granting 
permanent custody to the aunt. We agree. 
CONCLUSION 
The juvenile court incorrectly concluded 
that section 78-3a-47 required a material 
change of circumstances in the currently ex-
isting custodial relationship. Any change of 
circumstances affecting the interests of the 
children was sufficient for purposes of the 
statute. 
Nevertheless, the father also had the bur-
den to show that, in light of the changed 
circumstances, the best interests of his chil-
dren or the public require a change in the 
custody arrangement. He has failed to meet 
this Jburden. The juvenile court adequately 
addressed the children's best interests. The 
court determined that, in light of those inter-
ests, the father's petition for restoration of 
custody should be denied and the aunt's peti-
tion for permanent custody granted. 
The court did not exceed the scope of its 
discretion in reaching this all-important con-
clusion. The father had no right to assert 
the parental presumption in this case. Thus, 
despite the juvenile court's incorrect inter-
pretation of section 78-3a—47, we affirm its 
decision on the proper grounds of the chil-
dren's best interests. See Maertz v. Maertz. 
827 P.2d 259, 262 (Utah App.1992) ("We may 
affirm the trial court on any proper 
ground."). 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., concur. 
Barbara Lynn BUNCH, Plaintiff, 
Appellant, and Cross-
Appellee, 
v. 
Brian Lynn ENGLEHORN, Defendant, 
Appellee, and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 930707-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 22. 1995. 
Appeal was taken from order of the 
Fifth District Court, Iron County, J. Philip 
Eves, J., dismissing divorce complaint on 
grounds complainant had not met statutory 
criteria for establishing marriage. The 
Court of Appeals, Bench. J., held that: (1; 
statutory requirement that determination or 
establishment of unsolemnized marriage oc-
cr.r during relationship or within one year 
following termination of that relationship was 
not satisfied by tiling of divorce complaint 
within one year of parties' separation, and (2) 
claims challenging constitutionality of statute 
establishing procedure by which partie- val-
idate unsolemnized marriage relationship 
could not be raised for first time on appeal. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=>370 
Failure to timely pay filing fee on appeal 
from district court did not deprive Court of 
Appeals of jurisdiction. Rules App.Proc. 
Rule 3(a). 
2. Divorce 0=^177 
Order dismissing divorce complaint was 
final and appealable, despite purported hus-
band's oral request for attorney fees, where 
court declared in judgment that purported 
husband could claim attorney fees through 
filing of appropriate motion, and no motion 
wras ever filed with trial court. U.C.A.1953, 
78-20-56. 
3. Marriage <S=»55 
Statutory requirement that determina-
tion or'establishment of unsolemnized mar-
riage occur during relationship or within one 
BUNCH v. ENGLEHORN 
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vear following termination of that relation-
ship was not satisfied by filing of divorce 
complaint within one year of parties' separa-
tion. U.C.A.1953, 30-1-4.5. 
4. Marriage 0^55 
Statute governing validation of unsolem-
nized marriage relationship applied to rela-
tionship that began before statute's enact-
ment but lasted beyond enactment. U.C.A. 
1953. 30-1-4.5. 
5. Statutes @=»190 
When statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous. Court of Appeals will not look 
beyond it to surmise legislature's intent. 
tf. Appeal and Error <3=>170(2) 
To assert constitutional claims on ap-
oeal, parties generally must assert them first 
in trial court. 
7. Divorce 0=>179 
Claims challenging constitutionality of 
statute establishing procedure by which par-
ties can validate unsolemnized marriage rela-
tionship could not be raised for first time on 
appeal from dismissal of divorce complaint. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-1-4.5. 
Gary Bell, Salt Lake City, and Stephen W. 
Julien. Cedar City, for Appellant. 
Willard R. Bishop, Cedar City, for Appel-
lee. 
Before Judges ORME, BENCH and 
JACKSON. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Bunch appeals the trial court's dismissal of 
-er divorce complaint, claiming that the trial 
-ourt erred when it ruled that she had not 
•ttet the statutory criteria for establishing a 
carriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 
1995). We affirm. 
FACTS 
Bunch and Englehorn lived together for 
several years, without ever solemnizing a 
carriage. In August 1990, they separated. 
In May 1991, Bunch filed a divorce complaint 
against Englehorn. 
In June 1993, a trial was held. After 
opening statements, Englehorn orally moved 
the trial court to dismiss Bunch's complaint. 
The trial court granted Englehorn's motion, 
determining "that no court or administrative 
order was ever obtained establishing the par-
ties' relationship as a marriage within the 
required time limits" of section 30-1-4.5 of 
the Utah Code. The trial court concluded 
that it did not have subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and therefore dismissed the case with 
prejudice. 
.ANALYSIS 
Bunch appealed from the trial court's or-
der of dismissal and Englehorn counter-ap-
pealed claiming that this court does not have 
jurisdiction over the appeal. Wre first ad-
dress Englehorn's jurisdictional issues. We 
note that it is unnecessary to file a separate 
notice of appeal as a prerequisite to chal-
lenge the jurisdiction of appellate courts. 
See Utah RApp.P. 10(a)(1). 
[1] Englehorn contends that this court 
does not have jurisdiction because Bunch did 
not timely pay her filing fees. However, the 
Utah Supreme Court has declared that ' the 
timely payment of [filing] fees on an appeal 
from the district court to this [c]ourt is no 
longer jurisdictional." State v. Johnson, 700 
P.2d 1125, 1129 n. 1 (Utah 1985); see also 
Utah R.App.P. 3(a), (f). 
[2] Englehorn also contends that the trial 
court did not issue a final judgment or order 
because a question involving attorney fees is 
still pending. The trial court dismissed 
Bunch's complaint "with prejudice and upon 
the merits." In response to Englehorn's oral 
request for attorney fees, the trial court de-
clared in its Judgment of Dismissal with 
Prejudice, "[t]hat should Defendant desire to 
claim attorney fees pursuant to UCA 78-27-
56 (1953, as amended), he may do so through 
the filing of an appropriate motion, with ap-
propriate supporting affidavit and memoran-
dum, in order to give Plaintiff ample opportu-
nity to respond." No motion was ever filed 
with the trial court. Thus, the trial court's 
order to dismiss conclusively disposed of all 
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claims pending before the trial court.1 This 
court, therefore, has jurisdiction over the 
appeal. 
[3,4] Bunch contends that the trial court 
incorrectly determined that she had not met 
the requirements of section .30-1-4.5 to es-
tablish a marriage by merely filing her com-
plaint for divorce. We disagree. 
Until passage of section 30-1-4.5, Utah did 
not recognize unsoiemnized relationships as 
marriages. Walters v. Walters, S12 P.2d 64, 
67-68 (Utah App.l99U cert, denied 836 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1992). In 1987. the legislature 
enacted section 30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code.-
In section 30-1-4.5, the legislature estab-
lished the only procedure by which parties 
can validate an unsoiemnized marriage rela-
tionship. That section provides as follows: 
( D A marriage which is not solemnized 
according to this chapter snail be legal and 
valid if a court or administrative order 
establishes that it arises out of a contract 
between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a sol-
emnized marriage under the provisions 
of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, 
duties, and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have 
acquired a uniform and general reputa-
tion as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of 
a -marriage under this section must occur 
during the relationship described in Sub-
section (1), or icithin one year following 
the termination of that relationship. Evi-
dence of a marriage recognizable under 
this section may be manifested in any 
form, and may be proved under the same 
1. During oral argument before this court, coun-
sel for Englehom conceded that the trial court's 
order was a final judgment if Englehorn chose 
never to file for attorney fees. 
2. Englehorn cites U7zv:e v. Blair, 385 P.2d 791, 
793 n. 2 (Utah 1994) for the proposition that the 
parties' relationship could not be established 
pursuant to section 30-1-4.5 because Englehorn 
and Bunch began their relationship before 1987. 
general rules of evidence as facts in other 
cases. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1995; emphasis 
added). 
[5] This court reviews the trial court's 
interpretation of section 30-1—4.5 1995) un-
der a correctness standard. Utah Sign. Inc. 
v. Utah Dept of Tramp., 896 P.2d b32, 633-
34 (Utah 1995). "When interpreting stat-
utes, this court is guided by the long-stand-
ing rule that a statute should be construed 
according to its plain language." Id. at 633. 
Thus, when the statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, we will not look beyond it 
to surmise the legislature's intent. Brinker-
hoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d iWx 6*6 (Utah 
1989). Moreover, "[unambiguous language 
in the statute may not be interpreted to 
contradict its plain meaning." Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per 
curiam). 
Section 30-1—4.5 requires that those who 
wish to establish their relationship as a mar-
riage recognized by the state must obtain ua 
court or administrative order establish[ing]" 
their relationship. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-
4.5(1) (1995). Moreover, the statute requires 
that any such order be obtained within one 
year of the termination of the relationship. 
Id. § 30-1-4.5(2). Subsection (2) specifically 
provides that "determination or establish-
ment of a marriage . . . must occur during 
the relationship . . . or within one year fol-
lowing the termination of that relationship." 
Bunch admittedly did not obtain a determi-
nation during her relationship with Engle-
horn or within one year after the termination 
of their relationship. The parties separated 
in August 1990 and the trial court dismissed 
the case in June 1993, nearly three years 
after the parties separated. Bunch proposes 
that she complied with the statute by filing 
her complaint in May 1991, within one year 
Englehorn misreads the supreme court's lan-
guage in footnote 2 of Whyte. The supreme 
court merely stated that relationships that began 
and ended prior to 1987 were not valid, since 
common-law marriages were not recognized in 
Utah'prior to the enactment of section iO-l—*-3-
Because the parties' relationship indisputably 
lasted beyond 1987, the statute could apply in the 
present case. Id. 
rf the parties separation. 
itofl
 0f the statute, however, is contrary to its 
-jaia meaning. Under the piain meaning of 
. statute, Bunch did not obtain a timely 
^ennination of her relationship with Engle-
Bunch suggests that this interpretation of 
rig statute renders it unconstitutional under 
~ArOcle I, Sections 7 and 11 of the Constitu-
tion of Utah. Bunch never presented these 
jyguments to tne trial court, but raises them 
for the first time on appeal. 
{6,7] To assert constitutional claims on 
appeal, parties must generally assert them 
fast in the trial court. In State v. Bobo, 803 
pid 1268 (Utah App.1990). this court de-
»2ired that "the proper forum in which to 
commence thoughtful and probing analysis of 
gate constitutional interpretation is before 
She trial court, not. as typically happens . . . 
- fcr the first time on appeal" Id. at 1273. 
l ie closest Bunch came to making a consti-
Mstional argument to the trial court occurred 
wben the trial court asked counsel whether 
the facts of the case reflected any order that 
hd timely established a marital relationship. 
Counsel responded that there was no order, 
but MI guess I would have some concerns 
about the constitutionality of such a statute 
*feen it would make it—when a person files a 
Complaint to nave that determination made, 
tod simply because of the delays and court 
&ne and that sort of thing, I: can't get it to 
own." There is no thougntful or probing 
- ^ysifc of a state constitutional question in 
Bunch's statement. Bunch merely alludes to 
toe fact that mere may possibly be a consti-
^onal que-tion. "Nominally alluding" to 
ssfctitutional questions "without any analysis 
o r
 the redans stated, we cc not review the 
^nMituuon^n of section 30-1-4 5 We do 
c
 nowe\er that the statute might present a 
ConstHutiona' question in a dirterent context If 
t ourt were to enter a muement aenvine a 
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That interpreta- before the trial court does not sufficiently 
raise the issue to permit consideration by 
this court on appeal." State v. Johnson, 111 
P.2d 326, 328 (Utah App.1989), rev'd on other 
grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). 
Bunch also claims that she was surprised 
by Englehorn's oral motion to dismiss, de-
spite the fact that Englehorn had asserted 
this position as an affirmative defense in his 
verified answer. Assuming, arguendo, that 
Bunch was surprised by the motion, she 
could have asked the trial court for a continu-
ance and/or made a post-judgment motion to 
present her issues to the trial court. She did 
nothing to preserve the issues in the trial 
court. Having failed to argue her constitu-
tional issues to the trial court, we refuse to 
consider them. See id; accord Bobo, 803 
P.2d at 1273.3 
CONCLUSION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal. 
Bunch did not meet the requirements of sec-
tion 30-1^4.5 to establish a marriage with 
Englehorn and her constitutional challenge 
was improperly raised for the first time on 
appeal. Therefore, the trial court did not err 
in dismissing the case. 
Affirmed. 
ORME, P.J., and JACKSON, J., concur. 
E KEY NU*5EF SYSTEM > 
common-lau marriage within one vear of separa-
tion, and that judgment were re\ersed on appeal 
and the matter remanded, the parties might be 
denied a reasonable opportunity to comply with 
the plain meaning of the statute 
H. Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co., 448 P.2d 148 (Mont. 
1968) 
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Mona Carter M I L L E R , Claimant 
and Respondent, 
Charles D. Carter, Deceased, 
v. 
T O W N S E N D L U M B E R COMPANY, Inc., 
Employer, and Pacific Compensation Com-
pany, Insurance Carrier, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. I 1230. 
Supremo Court of Montana. 
Submitted Nov. 22. 1968. 
Decided Dec. 5, 1068. 
Proceeding on claim for workmen's 
compensation benefi ts . The First District 
Court, Lewis and Clark County, James D. 
Freebourne, J., rendered judgment re-
versing the action oi the Industrial Acci-
dent Board and determining that claimant 
was common-law wife of deceased work-
man and was the re fo re entitled to benefits. 
The Supreme Court , James T. Harr ison, 
C. J., held tha t instances of cohabitation on 
part of part ies could support conclusion of 
meretr icious re la t ions as easily as any other 
and were insufficient to show course of 
conduct to establish reputation as husband 
and wife. 
Judgmen t reversed and order of Board 
reinstated. 
1. Marriage <3=320(2) 
T o const i tute a "marr iage per verba de 
praesent i" , the par t ies must agree to become 
husband and wife presently, and the consent 
which is the essence of such marr iage con-
tract must be mutual and given at same 
time, and it must contemplate a present 
assumption oi mar r i age status. R.C.M. 
1947, §§ 48-101, 48-103. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Marriage € = 2 2 
A lawful m a r r i a g e must have been en-
tered into by the parties at some part icular 
t ime and such m a r r i a g e does not result from 
mere cohabitat ion alone. R.C.M.1947, §§ 
48-101, 48-103. 
3. Marriage 0 2 2 
T h e date of a marriage, established by 
conduct, cohabitation and repute, is the date 
of the commencement of such conduct and 
repute and not afterwards. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 
48-101, 48-103. 
4. Marriage C=>13 
Mutual consent of parties able to con-
sent and competent to enter into ceremonial 
mar r i age and assumption of marital rela-
tionship by consent and agreement as of a 
time certain, followed by cohabitation and 
repute, a re necessary to effect a "common-
law mar r i age" . R.CM.1947, §§ 48-101. 
48-103. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Marriage 0 2 2 
T o effect common-law marriage, par-
ties must enter upon course oi conduct to 
establish the i r repute as man and wife, and 
such course of conduct must be complete 
and sincere and not partial. R.C.M.1947, §§ 
48-101, 48-103. 
6. Marriage 0 2 2 
By " repu te" essential to effect com-
mon-law marr iage is meant reputation or 
the cha rac te r and status commonly ascribed 
to one's actions by public. R.CM.1947, §§ 
48-101, 48-103. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
7. Workmen's Compensation C=H474 
It was incumbent upon woman who 
sought to collect workmen's compensation 
benefits on ground that she was common-
law wife of workman at time of his death 
to prove by preponderance of evidence that 
mutual and public assumption of marital 
relation existed. R.CM.1947, §§ 48-101, 
48-103. . 
8. Marriage <S=22 
Ins tances of cohabitation on part of 
part ies could support conclusion of mere-
tr icious relations as easily as any other and 
to establish reputation as husband and wife. 
R.CM.1947. §§ 48-101, 4S-103. 
9. Workmen's Compensation C=>I939 
District Court is not justified in re-
versing: findings of Industrial Accident 
Board if there is sufficient evidence to sus-
tain them. 
10. Workmen's Compensation <$=3l474 
Evidence sustained finding" of Indus-
trial Accident Board that woman who 
sought to collect workmen's compensation 
benefits payable to survivor of deceased 
workman was not common-law wife of de-
ceased workman. R.CM.1947, §§ 48-101, 
48-103. 
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were insufficient to show course of conduct Mona Miller Carter, hereafter referred to 
as Mona, met in January of 1963 in Cali-
fornia at which time both were married to 
other persons. Within two or three weeks 
following this meeting they commenced liv-
ing together. Charles' wife, Mary Carter, 
wras killed in an automobile accident on 
June 24, 1963. About the 5th day of July, 
1963 Charles and Mona arrived in Town-
send, Montana, and stayed at a truck stop 
known as the Beacon, owned and operated 
by Charles' sister. While they stayed there 
Mona worked for Charles' sister and her 
pay checks were made out to her as Mona 
Miller. 
Along about September 4th or 5th, 1963, 
they went to Billings where for a time they 
resided at the Blue Motel. Mona's husband 
divorced her on October 18, 1963, but she 
did not know oi a possible divorce until she 
received a letter from her mother around 
November 4, 1963, in which her mother 
wrote that she had heard a divorce had been 
granted. Mona did not receive a copy of 
the decree, nor did she know the date or 
place of granting the divorce, until after 
Charles' death. About January 17, 1964, 
Charles came back to Townsend, Mona re-
mained in Billings and moved to the Harris 
Apartments, where she registered as Mona 
Miller and her apartment utilities were un-
der the name of Mona Miller. On January 
27, 1964, Charles assigned a car title to 
Mona showing her name as Mona G. Miller. 
Mona went to work in the Turf Cafe in 
Billings and her pay checks were made out 
to Mona Miller. She registered for general 
delivery at the Billings post office as Mona 
Miller, received mail from Charles under 
that name, as well as from other persons. 
On February 14, 1964, Charles went to 
Billings and Mona came back to Townsend 
with him and on the 15th of February took 
up residence at the Beacon Motel. Eleven 
davs later Charles was killed. 
Patrick F. Hooks (argued), Townsend, 
Ross Cannon (argued), Helena, for defend-
ants and appellants. 
Lloyd J. Skedd (argued), Helena, for 
claimant and respondent. 
JAMES T. HARRISOX, Chief Justice. 
This is an appeal from the district court 
of Broadwater County in a case arising 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
It raises the sole question of whether a 
valid marriage existed between Mona 
Miller and the deceased Charles D. Carter 
at the t:rne of his death in an industrial ac-
cident or. February 26, 1964. 
The Industrial Accident Board held that 
mere was no marriage and Mona's claim 
^a> clerv.ed. Deceased's mother survived 
h;m a:y; r.tr claim for the benefits provided 
by the \\ orkmen's Compensation Act was 
approve:;. An appeal was taken by Mona to 
me district court and that court entered 
t'.nmryjs or fact, conclusions of law and 
r.iMirmer.t reversing the action of the Indus-
trial .\cc:dent Board and determining that 
•»*ona was the common-law wife of the de-
cc'icm. This appeal followed. 
We wdl 
*he fac 
Carter 
set forth a brief recitation of 
situation prevailing. Charles D. 
hereafter referred to as Charles, 
*
n<i Mona Miller, being Mona Miller Mc-
to in this case as XVi»iams and referred 
Charles wrote his mother a letter from 
Billings, dated January 18, 1964, and we 
quote portions thereof: 
"Well, I don't know for sure when I will 
be leaving here. But I was planning on 
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going around the 5th of Feb. But Mona 
and I are having troubles now too. So I 
may just up and go next week. But I doubt 
it for I wont have enough money to get me 
there. So I suppose I will have to wait 
until around the 5th of Feb. 
"Her and I were figiiering on getting 
married this spring. But I don't think we 
will, for we just can't seem to get along for 
very long at a time. She is pretty hot 
headed, and so am I and one thing just leads 
to another, until we are at it. 
"I met her last March, when Mary and I 
were having our trouble. And we got along 
real swell, until Mar/ got killed and we 
came up here, and its been a fight seems 
like ever since." 
The letter then referred to the death of 
his wife, Mary, and continued: ''And from 
then on it seems like Mona and I have done 
nothing but argue. So as I say I may be 
leaving here by myself before or around the 
5th of Feb." 
There is considerable testimony in the 
record as to quarrels and arguments be-
tween Charles and Mona. 
At the hearings in this cause, besides her-
self, Mona presented two witnesses in her 
behalf. Iona Pauley, operator of the Blue 
Motel, testified on direct examination as to 
Charles and Mona living together in the 
motel and she thought they were husband 
and wife, that Mona had told her they were 
married in April of 1963. On cross-exam-
ination she testified that sometime after 
Christmas Charles said to her : "I guess you 
know Mona and I aren't married." She 
further testified that following the death of 
Charles she received a letter from Mona in 
which she said that Charles had been killed 
and that she was his common-law wife. 
Art Olson, a resident of Helena for the 
past seven years and before that a resident 
of Townsend, testified as to his acquaint-
ance with Charles over many years but he 
had not seen him for six or seven years 
when he met him on Main Street in Town-
send on February 8, 1964, at which time 
they had a conversation and Olson asked 
about his wife Mary and Charles replied: 
"Mary is dead, I have a new wife, Mona." 
They did not see each other again. 
On cross-examination it developed that 
after Charles' death Olson had gone to see 
Charles' sister and brother-in-law to find 
out what was going on, what was the deal. 
He said he had met Mona and he was trying 
to find out what this insurance was, who 
was supposed to get the money. He further 
admitted that he was a married man but not 
living with his wife and while he denied 
going with Mona he admitted they had been 
out together for dinner six or eight times 
in the preceding two months. 
Offsetting this testimony was that of 
fellow workers and residents of Townsend 
whose testimony reflected that Charles 
never held Mona out as his wife, nor did 
Mona hold Charles out as her husband pre-
vious to his death. Of course there are ex-
hibits of various kinds indicating that on 
occasion Mona used the name Carter in-
stead of Miller but most of these are after 
the death of Charles. 
On this record the district court reversed 
the holding of the Industrial Accident 
Board and held that Mona was the common-
law wife of Charles within the meaning of 
section 48-101, R.C.M.1947. 
The district judge filed an opinion in 
this cause outlining his reasons for arriving 
at his judgment and we quote: 
"Claimant and deceased commenced to 
live together in January, February or July, 
1963. From that time until January 18. 
1964, the evidence introduced showed con-
ditions existed very similar to those set 
forth in Morrison, et al., v. Sunshine 
Mining Company, 64 Idaho 6, 127 P.2d 766f 
and Albina Engine and Machine Works, 
etc., v. J. J. O'Leary, et al., 9 Cir., 32S F.2d 
877. Both cases held a common law mar-
riage existed. 
"We can accept the relationship between 
claimant and Charles Carter as illicit in 
1963. It is agreed by all that claimant and 
Charles Carter did live together and carried 
on certain relations as if they were husband 
and wife. 
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"Sometime immediately prior to January 
18, 1964, claimant, over a dispute, left de-
ceased and went to live alone in Billings. 
Decedent on January 18, 1964, wrote his 
mother that he intended to marry Nona 
(sic) if all could be straightened out. Six 
weeks before his death Charles Carter went 
to Billings and returned to Townsend wTith 
Nona (sic). They did not return to live in 
the sister's bar, but rented an apartment and 
claimant and Charles Carter lived in the re-
lationship he described in his letter to his 
mother, that of husband and wife, Section 
48-101, R.C.M.1947, being fully satisfied.'1 
[1-6] The two cases cited by the court 
are both interpretations of the Idaho stat-
utes. There is no reason to discuss either 
case herein for the reason that our laws are 
not the same and this court in Miller v. 
Sutherland, 131 Mont. 175, 309 P.2d 322, re-
viewed the Montana statutes and cases and 
this cause is to be determined under the 
rulings laid down therein. In that case we 
stated: 
"Our statute with regard to marriage is 
R.C.M.1947, § 48-101, which provides: 
" 'Marriage is a personal relation arising 
o.it of a civil contract, to which the consent 
of parties capable of making it is necessary. 
Consent alone will not constitute marriage; 
it must be followed by a solemnization, or 
by mutual and public assumption of the 
marital relation.' 
"R.C.M.1947, § 48-103, provides: 'Con-
sent to and subsequent consummation of 
marriage may be manifested m any form, 
and may be proved under the same general 
rules of evidence as facts in other cases.' 
"In construing our statutes this court in 
Welch v. All Persons, 85 Mont. 114, 133, 278 
P. 110, 115, stated: 
u
 'Marriage is defined by our statute as 
a "personal relation arising out of a civil 
contract, to which the consent of parties 
capable of making it is necessary". Section 
5695, R.C1921 [§ 4S-101, supra]. This 
terse definition embraces the essential ele-
ments recognized by the authorities gen-
erally. See 38 C.J. 1272 et seq.; 18 R.C.L. 
381 et seq. 
'• "The consent of the parties must be mu-
tual. Shepherd & Piercon Co. v. Baker, 81 
Mont. 185, 262 P. 887. While the consent 
need not be expressed in any particular 
form (section 5697, R.C.1921 [§ 48-103, 
supra]), as we said in State v. Newman, 
66 Mont. 180, 213 P. 805, it must always be 
given with such an intent on the part of 
each of the parties that marriage cannot be 
said to steal upon them unawares. "One 
cannot become married unwittingly or acci-
dentally. The consent required by our stat-
utes, as well as the statutes of every state, 
and by the common law, must be seriously 
given with the deliberate intention that 
marriage result presently therefrom." 
"There must be an agreement between the 
parties that they will hold toward each 
other the relation of husband and wife, 
with all the responsibilities and duties which 
the law attaches to such relation, otherwise 
there can be no lawful marriage." Wil-
liams v. Williams, supra [46 Wis. 464, 1 
N.W. 98, 32 Am.Rep. 722]. The absence of 
such consent renders the relations of the 
parties meretricious. 38 C.J. 1316.' * * * 
"We stated in State v. Newman, 66 Mont. 
180, 188, 213 P. 805,807: 
" 'The necessary consent need not be ex-
pressed in any particular form. Section 
5697 Rev.Codes 1921. In a proper case it 
may even be implied from the conduct of 
the parties. University of Michigan v. Mc-
Guckin, 64 Neb. 300, 89 N.W. 778, 57 L.R.A. 
917. But the consent, whether in express 
words, or implied from conduct, must al-
ways be given with such an intent on the 
part of each of the parties that marriage 
cannot be said to steal upon them unawares. 
* * * The words manifesting the consent 
may be spoken in the face of the church, 
or immediately preceding an act of sexual 
intercourse, as claimed in this case. But 
they must always be spoken by those who 
know and intend that matrimony in full 
form shall be the result. Marriage cannot 
be created piecemeal. It comes instantly 
into being, or it does not come a t all. If 
anything remains to be done before the re-
lationship is completed in contemplation of 
the parties themselves, there is no marriage. 
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" '
 4Tn order to constitute a marriage per 
verba [dc] praesenti the parties must agree 
to become husband and wife presently. The 
consent which is the foundation and essence 
of the contract must be mutual and given 
at the same time, and it must not be attended 
by an agreement that some intervening 
thing shall be done before the marriage 
takes effect, or that it be publicly solem-
nized. That is to say, it must contemplate a 
present assumption of the marriage status, 
in distinction from a mere future union." 
Lord Brougham in Queen v. Millis, 10 CI. & 
F. 534, 708, 730; Clark v. Field, 13 Vt. 460. 
Beneficial Ass'n v. Carpenter, 17 R.I. 720, 
24 A. 578.' 
* * * * * * 
''As was stated in Welch v. All Persons, 
78 Mont. 370, 386, 254 P. 179, 183: 
" 'Every lawful marriage must have been 
entered into by the parties at some partic-
ular time. It does not result from mere 
cohabitation alone. "As a general rule, 
when a marriage is sought to be proved by 
conduct, cohabitation and repute, the date 
of the marriage in fact, which such conduct 
and repute tends to establish, is the date of 
the commencement of such conduct and re-
pute, and not afterwards". Williams v. 
Williams, 46 Wis. 464, 1 N.W. 98, 32 Am. 
Rep. 722.' 
* * * * * * 
"As was stated in Elliott v. Industrial 
Accident Board, 101 Mont. 246, 254, 53 P.2d 
451, 454: 
" 'One of the disputable presumptions in 
this state is "that a man and a woman de-
porting themselves as husband and wife 
have entered into a lawful contract of mar-
riage". Subdivision 30, sec. 10606, Rev. 
Codes 1921 [R.C.M.1947, § 93-1301-7]. 
" 'The so-called "common-law marriage" 
is recognized as valid in this state, but, to be 
effective there must be the mutual con-
sent of parties able to consent and compe-
tent to enter into a ceremonial marriage, 
and the assumption of such relationship, by 
consent and agreement, as of a time certain, 
followed by cohabitation and repute/ 
"Thus the parties must enter upon a 
course of conduct to establish their repute 
as man and wife. This course of conduct 
cannot be partial, it must be complete and 
sincere. * * * 
"When we speak of repute we mean repu-
tation, being the character and status com-
monly ascribed to one's actions by the pub-
lic. * * * The burden of establishing the 
marriage was on appellant * * *." 
Returning to the court's opinion the judge 
accepted the relationship as illicit in 1963 
and went on to state that six weeks before 
his death Charles brought Mona to Town-
send, although the record shows it was only 
12 days; further, that they did not return 
to live in the sister's bar, although the rec-
ord shows that the sister's business was a 
cafe and motel; further, that they rented 
an apartment, although the record shows 
that they stayed there but a single night and 
then went to the sister's motel. There the 
record shows they occupied a room with 
a hot plate for cooking but it was little used 
since their meals were either taken at the 
cafe or carried from the cafe to their room. 
The court finally observed that Charles and 
Mona lived in the relationship he, Charles, 
described in his letter to his mother, that of 
husband and wife. We have heretofore 
quoted the only portions of this letter which 
directly deal with Mona and that states ex-
actly the opposite. 
[7, 8] It was incumbent upon Mona to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that a mutual and public assumption of the 
marital relation existed. Instances of co-
habitation on the part of the parties, and 
admittedly the record is replete with such 
instances here, can support the conclusion 
of meretricious relations as easily as any 
other. The parties must enter upon a 
course of conduct to establish their repute 
as man and wife. By repute we mean repu-
tation, being the character and status com-
monly ascribed to one's actions by the pub-
lic. The evidence herein falls far short of 
establishing a reputation by Charles and 
Mona that they were husband and wife. 
PETITION OF 
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[9] We have many times held that the 
district court is not justified in reversing 
findings of the Industrial Accident Board 
if there is sufficient evidence to sustain 
them. See Stordahl v. Rush Implement 
Co., 148 Mont. 13, 417 P.2d 95, and cases 
therein cited. 
[10] Our determination is that the facts 
disclosed by the record here do not prepon-
derate against the findings of the Indus-
trial Accident Board and the district court 
erred when it held that the order of the In-
dustrial Accident Board was not sustained 
by the evidence, was unreasonable and or-
dered the same to be set aside. 
Accordingly the judgment is reversed 
and the order of the Industrial Accident 
Board herein is ordered reinstated. 
HASWELL, ADAIR and CASTLES, 
JT., concur. 
HOLLIDAY Mont. 1 5 3 
P.2d 153 
record disclosed that other charges, some of 
them even more serious, had been dismissed. 
Writ denied. 
Habeas Corpus <^25.I(3) 
Claims that defendant's plea of guilty to 
burglary charge was obtained by fraud, de-
ceit and trickery and that his retained coun-
sel advised him that if he went to trial he 
would receive 50-year sentence but if he pled 
guilty would receive suspended sentence or 
at most one year afforded no ground for 
habeas corpus relief where counsel had been 
active in criminal defenses for many years 
and every member of the firm knew that 
maximum penalty for burglary was 15 years, 
counsel's statement indicated knowledgeable, 
active defense work to defendant's advan-
tage, and record disclosed that other charg-
es, some of them even more serious, had 
been dismissed. R.C.M.1947, § 94-903. 
7w\ 
(p | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Petition of Thomas F. HOLLIDAY. 
No. 11598. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Dec. 12, 1968. 
Proceeding on petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus. The Supreme Court held that 
claims that defendant's plea of guilty to bur-
glary charge was obtained by fraud, deceit 
and trickery and that his retained counsel 
advised him that if he went to trial he would 
receive 50-year sentence but if he pled guilty 
would receive suspended sentence or at most 
one year afforded no ground for habeas cor-
pus relief where counsel had been active in 
criminal defenses for many years and every 
member of the firm knew that maximum 
penalty for burglary was 15 years, counsel's 
statement indicated knowledgeable, active 
defense work to defendant's advantage, and 
448 P.2d—10V2 
Thomas F. Holliday pro se. 
MEMO OPINION 
PER CURIAM: 
Thomas F. Holliday, an inmate of the 
state prison at Deer Lodge, Montana, ap-
pearing pro se, files with this Court a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner 
was sentenced to a term oi ten years in the 
district court of Yellowstone County, Mon-
tana, on February 1, 1968, following his 
plea of guilty to the crime of burglary. 
The court file discloses that on Decem-
ber 6, 1967, an information was filed charg-
ing petitioner with the crime of burglary 
alleged to have been committed on Decem-
ber 3, 1967. Petitioner appeared before the 
court on December 6, was given a copy of 
the information and he informed the court 
he desired counsel and that he would obtain 
his own counsel. The arraignment was then 
continued until December 11, 1967. 
On December 11, 1967, he appeared in 
court in company with one of his counsel, 
Russell Fillner, of the firm of Sandall, 
Moses and Cavan. A copy of the informa-
I. Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs. 590 P.2d 1346 (Wyo. 1979) 
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and that of defendant Hospital, the com-
plaint alleges defendant Fishburn to be a 
member of the staff of defendant Hospital 
and that he was "acting as Defendant Hos-
pital's agent and employee and performing 
within the scope and course of that agency 
and employment, and within the scope of 
his position as a member of the Defendant 
Hospital Staff." In their answers, defend-
ants Fishburn and Hospital denied the alle-
gations. The only reference to this allega-
tion in the interrogatories and the answers 
thereto, is an affirmative answer by de-
fendants Fishburn and Hospital to plain-
tiff's question as to whether or not defend-
ant Fishburn was a member of the staff of 
defendant Hospital on June 6 and 7, 1976. 
Since there is an issue as to the fact of 
employment which may involve the applica-
tion of the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
defendant Hospital's position with refer-
ence to the summary judgment cannot be 
different than that of defendant Fishburn. 
Reversed. 
ROONEY, Justice, separate opinion, with 
whom RAPER, C. J., joins. 
Although the foregoing is determinative 
of this case, I believe it proper to address 
the application of the so-called "locality 
rule" inasmuch as I believe the record indi-
cates the probability that the question will 
arise again in connection with the trial of 
this matter.1 Justices McClintock, Thomas, 
and Rose do not agree with my belief and 
feel that discussion of the "locality rule" is 
unnecessary to the disposition of the case. 
They do not join herein for that reason. 
The so-called "locality rule" was an alter-
nate premise upon which the summary 
judgment was granted. The rule is to the 
effect that an opinion concerning the pro-
priety of medical action taken by a physi-
cian must be prefaced by a showing of 
knowledge of the standards of practice in 
the community in which the physician prac-
tices, since a rural community, for example, 
did not have the equipment, opportunities 
for consultation and learning, and facilities 
1. In such instance, " * * * it is our right, if 
it is not our duty, to decide the question." 
afforded by large cities. Although the rule 
may have been premised upon an accepta-
ble basis at one time, it is now without 
logical basis in view of availability of mod-
ern communication methods whereby me-
chanical readings of body functions and re-
actions can be transmitted immediately to 
other centers for reading and diagnosis, 
available telephonic consultations, wide-
spread dissemination of medical literature, 
and means of rapid transportation. This is 
not to say that testimony as to the stan-
dards in a similar community and the avail-
ability and use of modern communication 
and transportation methods are not to be 
considered in determination of the existence 
or nonexistence of negligence, but they 
should be merely one of the factors to be 
considered in making this determination, 
and not a single controlling factor. Negli-
gence cannot be excused on the ground that 
others in the same locality practicod the 
same kind of negligence. Hundley v. Mar-
tinez, 151 W.Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967); 
Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash.2d 73, 431 
P.2d 973 (1967). This is said in full recogni-
tion of the statements made by this court in 
Covin v. Hunter, Wyo., 374 P.2d 421 (1962). 
JIM'S WATER SERVICE, Appellant 
(Employer-Defendant below), 
v. 
Judith Marie EAYRS, on behalf of 
James Clinton Eayrs, Appellee 
(Employee-Plaintiff below). 
No. 5037. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
March 6, 1979. 
Employer appealed from judgment of 
the District Court, Weston County, Paul T. 
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. City of Riverton, 70 
Wyo. 119, 127. 247 P.2d 660, 663 (1952). 
JIM'S WATER SERVICE v. EAYRS Wyo. 1347 
Cite as, Wyo. 
Liamos, Jr., J., awarding death benefits, 
under Workers' Compensation Law, to wid-
ow and her three children. The Supreme 
Court, McClintock, J., held that: (1) the 
required nexus between exertion and stress, 
exerted by truck driver, and the resulting 
coronary occlusion which occurred when 
driver and another were attempting to ex-
tricate truck from snow, was established by 
substantial evidence; (2) exertion of truck 
driver in an extended effort to extricate his 
truck from snow exceeded normal routine 
and thus, while not different in kind, was 
greater in degree than normal sufficiently 
to establish that exertion occurred during a 
period of stress unusual or abnormal to 
working conditions as basis for recovery of 
death benefits following trucker's heart at-
tack; (3) evidence established valid com-
mon-law marriage under Montana law be-
tween truck driver and his widow and thus 
widow was "legally married" for purposes 
of receipt of death benefits under Wyo-
ming's Workers' Compensation Laws; (4) 
Legislature intended to make substantial 
dependency the test of eligibility of alleged-
ly dependent children for death benefits 
under Workers' Compensation Law, thus 
eliminating prior confusion and dispute re-
garding stepchildren, adoption, legitimacy, 
lineage and alienage, and (5) testimony of 
surviving widow sufficiently supported 
finding that truck driver had provided sub-
stantially all of financial support for chil-
dren so as to entitle children to death bene-
fits, notwithstanding that widow did not 
state in dollar figures how much truck driv-
er had earned or contributed. 
Judgment and order of award af-
firmed. 
1. Workers' Compensation <3=>1536 
The required nexus between exertion 
and stress, exerted by truck driver, and the 
resulting coronary occlusion wThich occurred 
when driver and another were attempting 
to extricate truck from snow, was estab-
lished by substantial evidence in worker's 
compensation case for recovery of death 
benefits. W.S.1977, § 27-12-603. 
, 590 P.2d 1346 
2. Workers' Compensation ^ ^ ^ l 
Exertion of truck driver in an extended 
effort to extricate his truck from snow ex-
ceeded normal routine and thus, while not 
different in kind, was greater in degree 
than normal sufficiently to establish that 
exertion occurred during a period of stress 
unusual or abnormal to working conditions 
as basis for recovery of death benefits fol-
lowing trucker's heart attack, in worker's 
compensation case. W.S.1977, § 27-12-603. 
3. Workers' Compensation <s=>433, 1474 
Evidence established valid common-law 
marriage under Montana law between 
truck driver and his widow who sought 
worker's compensation death benefits, and 
thus widow was "legally married,, for pur-
poses of receipt of death benefits under 
Wyoming's Workers' Compensation Laws. 
R.C.M.1947, § 48-314; W.S.1977, §§ 20-1-
111, 27-12-102, 27-12-408(a). 
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>458 
Legislature intended to make substan-
tial dependency the test of eligibility of 
allegedly dependent children for death ben-
efits under Workers' Compensation Law, 
thus eliminating prior confusion and dispute 
regarding stepchildren, adoption, legitima-
cy, lineage and alienage. W.S.1977, §§ 27-
12-102, 27-12-408(a). 
5. Workers' Compensation <&=>1478 
Testimony of surviving widow suffi-
ciently supported finding that truck driver, 
who died of heart attack during employ-
ment, had provided substantially all of fi-
nancial support for children so as to entitle 
children to death benefits under Workers' 
Compensation Law, notwithstanding that 
widow did not state in dollar figures how 
much truck driver had earned or contribut-
ed. 
Francis E. Stevens, Gillette, for appel-
lant. 
Gordon W. Schukei, Newcastle, for appel-
lee. 
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Before RAPER, C. J., McCLINTOCK, 
THOMAS and ROSE, JJ., and GUTHRIE, 
J., Retired.* 
McCLINTOCK, Justice. 
Jim's Water Service, employer, appeals 
from judgment of the district court of We-
ston County awarding death benefits to Ju-
dith Marie Eayrs and her three children. 
The claim had its basis in the death of 
James Clinton Eayrs. Employer contends 
that the death was not compensable under 
our Worker's Compensation statutes be-
cause of failure to prove a proper causal 
relation between the death and abnormal 
working conditions; that Judith is not enti-
tled to benefits as a surviving spouse be-
cause no formal marriage existed between 
her and the decedent and no common-law 
marriage was proved; and that award of 
benefits to the children should have been 
denied since their dependency upon dece-
dent was not shown. We shall affirm, re-
citing the facts as they become pertinent to 
the particular issue involved. 
The Cause of Death 
The cause of the death was determined to 
be an occlusive coronary atherosclerosis. 
The employer contends that the evidence 
was insufficient to prove the required direct 
causal connection between the condition of 
the work and the death.1 
On November 10, 1977 James was em-
ployed by Jim's Water Service, Inc. in Gil-
lette. He started work the next day as a 
driver of a water truck which was employed 
hauling water to oil rigs in the area. His 
duties basically included the driving and 
some simple maintenance of the truck. 
* At the time of oral argument Guthrie, J., was 
Chief Justice. He retired from the court on 
December 31, 1978. By order of the court, 
entered on January 1, 1979, he has been re-
tained in active judicial service pursuant to § 5, 
Art. V, Wyoming Constitution and § 5 - 1 -
106(0, W.S.1977, and has continued to partici-
pate in the decision and opinion of the court in 
this case. 
1. Section 27-12-603, W.S.1977 provides in per-
tinent part: 
"(b) Benefits for employment-related coro-
nary conditions except those directly and 
James worked long hours, sometimes driv-
ing up to 18 hours a day. Nine days after 
he started to work he was hauling water to 
a drilling rig in Weston County and his 
truck became stuck in a snowdrift. It was 
a cold day, with strong winds and deep, 
blowing snow. James walked about one 
mile through the snow to seek help, arriv-
ing at the residence of Jack Dowdy between 
nine and ten o'clock that morning. William 
Riehemann drove with him back to the 
scene in Riehemann's Jeep at about three 
o'clock in the afternoon but they had to 
walk two to three hundred yards through 
the snow to the truck. They then shoveled 
vigorously for about one-half hour. About 
four o'clock James climbed into the cab to 
drive while Riehemann was to push. The 
motor began to race, and when Riehemann 
went to the cab he found James slumped 
over the wheel. James stopped breathing 
very shortly afterward and was pronounced 
dead at 5:50 p. m. 
The manager of the employer's Douglas 
division testified that long hours for such 
drivers were ordinary and normal. It was 
not unusual or abnormal for drivers to be-
come stuck in the snow or mud or to lift 
fairly heavy objects. Each truck carried a 
shovel and chains and drivers were expect-
ed to attempt to free their trucks from 
difficulties. If they were unable to do so 
they were expected to use a high-frequency 
radio in the truck to call for help. James 
made no such call. 
[1] James D. Henry, M.D., a qualified 
pathologist, performed an autopsy upon the 
body and found the cause of death to be an 
occlusive coronary atherosclerosis. He 
solely caused by an injury or disease are not 
payable unless the employee establishes by 
competent medical authority that there is a 
direct causal connection between the condi-
tion under which the work was performed 
and the cardiac condition, and then only if 
the causative exertion occurs during the ac-
tual period of employment stress clearly un-
usual to, or abnormal for, employees in that 
particular employment, and further that the 
acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are 
clearly manifested not later than four (4) 
hours after the alleged causative exertion.'* 
JIM'S WATER SERVICE v. EAYRS 
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found the heart to show existing marked 
occlusion of up to 90 per cent of all three 
major vessels. He declined to say that he 
could determine to a reasonable medical 
certainty that the stress caused or precipi-
tated the death and stated that James could 
have died in his sleep just as easily as on 
the job. However, he also testified that the 
stress was a "contributing factor" and that 
the arrhythmia "very likely" and "proba-
bly" was due to the physical exertion and 
strain. That is sufficient evidence of the 
causal connection. The question that needs 
to be answered is whether the work effort 
contributed to a material degree to the pre-
cipitation, aggravation or acceleration of 
the existing disease and the resulting death. 
Claim of Vondra, Wyo., 448 P.2d 313 (1968); 
Claim of Hill, Wyo., 451 P.2d 794 (1969); 
Claim of Brannan. Wyo., 455 P.2d 241 
(1969). See also, 1 Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, § 12.20, p. 3-276. 
While it is not a compensation case, this 
quotation from Rocky Mountain Trucking 
Company v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 479, 335 
P.2d 448, 453 (1959) is also pertinent: 
"A belief entertained by an expert is a 
positive opinion about which he is entitled 
to testify. His belief is not a statement 
of mere possibility unless the witness so 
qualifies it." 
The required nexus between the exertion 
and stress and the resulting coronary occlu-
sion was found by the trier of fact and is 
supported by substantial evidence. 
The second aspect of this question, 
whether the exertion of James occurred 
during a period of stress unusual or abnor-
mal to his working conditions, must also be 
answered in claimant's favor. The mana-
ger's testimony concerning decedent's 
duties and the driver's obligations when 
2. This section as amended by Ch. 149, § 1, S.L. 
of Wyoming 1975 permits benefits to a "spouse 
to whom the employee was legally married." 
Under the law prior to the 1975 amendment, 
§ 27-49[II](d), W.S.1957, no benefits were per-
mitted to a surviving spouse "unless he or she 
shall have been married to the workman by a 
marriage duly solemnized by legal ceremony at 
the time of the injury." Section 27-87, W.S. 
1957 permitted benefits to a widow or invalid 
widower to whom the decedent "has been regu-
stuck does not completely answer the ques-
tion. The best approach is first to ascertain 
the normal and usual task of the driver and 
then determine if the event in question 
exceeded that limit. 
[2] James was expected to haul water 
and to maintain his truck. In the event he 
became snowbound he was expected to use 
reasonable efforts to extricate himself. 
The trier of fact had sufficient substantial 
evidence to find the normal routine was 
exceeded when James acted to the degree 
he did and that the stress or exertion, while 
not different in kind, was greater in degree 
than normal. It appears from the evidence 
James was involved in an effort that con-
sumed the entire day of November 20 and 
involved extensive and strenuous efforts. 
In Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 566 P.2d 
219 (1977) we found the burden satisfied 
when the causative exertion was clearly 
something beyond the worker's normal and 
usual routine. We will not disturb the de-
termination of facts here. 
The Marital Relation of the Parties 
In order for Judith to receive benefits 
under our law she must have been "legally 
married" to James. Section 27-12-408(a), 
W.S.1977.2 
James and Judith were married in 1969 
but divorced in 1974. For a while they 
maintained contact after their separation 
on a sporadic basis. James provided no 
support during these years because of ina-
bility to do so. In June of 1977 he returned 
to Kalispell and resumed living with Judith 
but they did not formally remarry. Judith 
was disabled and her only income was from 
disability benefits provided to her by the 
State. James worked periodically and pro-
larly married by a marriage duly solemnized by 
a legal ceremony." The constitutionality of the 
former statute was specifically left open in 
Bowers v. Getter Trucking Company, Wyo., 
514 P.2d 837 (1973) and the cause remanded to 
the district court for a determination whether a 
valid common-law marriage had been effected 
in Texas. That determination has now been 
made and the case is again pending in this 
court. 
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vided such support as he could for her and 
the three children, although evidence is 
lacking as to the amount. They had no 
joint financial accounts or other joint prop-
erty. His odd-job employment required 
him to leave Kalispell, and occasionally 
Montana, but he always maintained Judith 
and the children's residence as his own. 
The two shared expenses, care, work, and a 
home. They considered themselves man 
and wife and represented this to friends 
and the world. They were, in Judith's 
words, "still married; as far as God's law 
we had not been divorced." 
The employer concedes that the residence 
of the parties and the marriage, if any, 
were in Montana and that the State of 
Montana still recognizes common-law mar-
riage. Section 48-314, R.C.M.1975. He 
also concedes that under § 20-1-111, W.S. 
1977 we must look to Montana as all mar-
riages which are valid by the laws of that 
state are to be valid in Wyoming. Hoag-
land v. Hoagland, 2TI Wyo/l78, 193 P. 843 
(1920). If James and Judith were found to 
be validly married under the common law, 
she would therefore be entitled to benefits 
under our statute. The point of the em-
ployer's argument is that the facts here do 
not support the trial court's decision finding 
a valid common-law marriage and giving 
Judith her due. 
As essential elements of such a marriage 
Montana requires mutual consent, assump-
tion of a relationship by consent and agree-
ment as of a certain time, cohabitation, and 
repute. Welch v. All Persons, 78 Mont. 370, 
254 P. 179 (1927); Elliott v. Industrial Acci-
dent Board, 101 Mont. 246, 53 P.2d 451 
(1936); Miller v. Sutherland, 131 Mont. 175, 
309 P.2d 322 (1957). The burden to prove 
these elements is on the one asserting the 
validity of the marriage, and is satisfied by 
a preponderance of the evidence. However, 
there is a strong presumption in favor of 
the legality of a common-law marriage. 
Welch v. All Persons, supra; In re Estate of 
Slavens, 162 Mont. 123, 509 P.2d 293 (1973). 
The element of repute is a key term, and 
several cases where the Supreme Court re-
versed the finding turned on this issue. 
Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co., 152 Mont. 
210, 448 P.2d 148 (1968); Estate of Slavens, 
supra; Matter of Estate of McClelland, 168 
Mont. 160, 541 P.2d 780 U975). The cases 
make clear that repute means general com-
munity reputation, that is, did the parties 
consider themselves as married and so act 
as to all the world? It relates to the repu-
tation, character and status of the relation-
ship. Welch v. All Persons, 85 Mont. 114, 
278 P. 110 (1929). 
[3] On the evidence presented here we 
have no choice but to affirm. The only 
evidence on the issue was given by Judith 
and it supports the marriage. Not all the 
formalities were followed, but repute, con-
sent and cohabitation were all proven suffi-
ciently by uncontradicted testimony and 
presumption of law. 
Cases cited in Bowers v. Getter Trucking 
Company, Wyo., 514 P.2d 837 (1973) may 
have required a different result, but they 
were decided before the amendment of 
§ 27^-12-408(a), W.S.1977. The statute in 
effect at the time of Bowers required a 
surviving spouse to have been "regularly 
married by a marriage duly solemnized by a 
legal ceremony" before benefits could be 
given. Our new statute, enacted shortly 
after the rendition of this undefinitive opin-
ion, requires only that the parties have been 
"legally married." We hold that a com-
mon-law marriage valid in the state in 
which contracted is valid in Wyoming for 
purposes of receipt of benefits under our 
Worker's Compensation laws. We find no 
error by the trial judge in finding Judith to 
be James' legal widow. 
The Dependency of the Children 
[4] Finally, we review the award of ben-
efits the district court made to the children, 
as dependents of the deceased. Tina and 
Julie Johnson were children of Judith's pre-
vious marriage. Hallie Eayrs was the natu-
ral child of Judith and James' marriage in 
1969. Although James never formally 
adopted Tina and Julie there is evidence of 
his support and concern. After the divorce 
all three children continued to live in Kalis-
pell. The statute under which the award 
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must be based is § 27-12-102, W.S.1977, 
which is the definitional section. A "child" 
is to include "any individual," except a par-
ent or spouse, who receives "substantially 
all" of his or her financial support from the 
employee before the injury or death and 
who is an unmarried minor or physically or 
mentally incapacitated. The statute 
defines a "dependent" as any individual, 
except the employee, who is entitled to ben-
efits under the act. There are no Wyoming 
cases that further define or interpret these 
sections, hence we look to authority from 
other states and the language of the statute 
itself. The previous decisions from this 
court, In re Dragoni, 53 Wyo. 143, 79 P.2d 
465 (1938); In re Trent's Claim, 68 Wyo. 
146, 231 P.2d 180 (1951); Smith v. National 
Tank Company, Wyo., 350 P.2d 539 (1960); 
and Heather v. Delta Drilling Co., Wyo., 533 
P.2d 1211 (1975), reh. denied, were decided 
under the law prior to amendment and that 
law was more restrictive. Now, we see the 
test as whether the individual benefited 
was substantially dependent upon the work-
er. As it is presumed that an amendment is 
made with the intent to change the law and 
that the legislature knows the law to be 
changed, De Herrera v. Herrera, Wyo., 565 
P.2d 479 (1977), reh. denied, we conclude 
that the definition of a child was intended 
by the legislature to make substantial de-
pendency the test of eligibility and to elimi-
nate the confusion and dispute existing be-
fore regarding stepchildren, adoption, legit-
imacy, lineage, and alienage. Whether any 
individual is substantially dependent upon 
another is a question of fact not to be 
disturbed by this court when substantial 
evidence exists to support that finding. 
It is true that the claimants bear the 
burden of proving the essential elements of 
their claim and by the preponderance of the 
evidence to establish their entitlement to 
award. Pease v. Pacific Power & Light 
Company, Wyo., 453 P.2d 887 (1969); Black 
Watch Farms v. Baldwin, Wyo., 474 P.2d 
297 (1970); Gifford v. Cook-McCann Con-
crete, Inc., Wyo., 526 P.2d 1197 (1974), and 
the rule of liberal construction does not 
relieve the burden, Olson v. Federal Ameri-
can Partners, Wyo., 567 P.2d 710 (1977); 
Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, supra; In re Hardi-
son, Wyo., 429 P.2d 320 (1967). However, 
the worker is entitled to a contrary pre-
sumption after the district court makes a 
finding that the evidence at the hearing is 
sufficient to sustain that burden, Wyoming 
State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compen-
sation Department v. Schultz, Wyo., 444 
P.2d 313 (1968), and we will not disturb the 
determination of the trier of fact if it is 
supported by substantial evidence. Olson v. 
Federal American Partners, supra; Wil-
liams v. Northern Development Co., Wyo., 
425 P.2d 594 (1967); Standard Oil Co. of 
Indiana v. Sullivan, 33 Wyo. 223, 237 P. 253 
(1925). If the evidence is conflicting this 
court will only consider that evidence favor-
able to the claimant, Richard v. George 
Noland Drilling Company, 79 Wyo. 124, 331 
P.2d 836 (1958); In re Corey, 65 Wyo. 301, 
200 P.2d 333 (1948), and give it every favor-
able inference that might be reasonably and 
fairly drawn from it. 
We note that by use of the language in 
the amendment the legislature changed the 
rule of Heather, supra, where we found a 
presumption of dependency. It appears the 
legislature intends to define a dependent as 
a child and proof of substantial dependency 
is required before any award can be made 
to such person. WTe also note that use of 
the term "substantially all" falls somewhere 
between "total" and "partial" dependency 
as required by other laws. Padilla v. Indus-
trial Commission, 113 Ariz. 104, 546 P.2d 
1135 (1976), vac. 24 Ariz.App. 42, 535 P.2d 
634 (1975); De Mendoza v. Worker's Com-
pensation Appeals Board, 54 Cal.App.3d 
820, 127 Cal.Rptr. 173 (1976); 2 Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, §§ 63:12, 
63:13, pp. 11-63—11-76. 
Wrebster's Third New International Dic-
tionary, 1971, defines "substantial" as "ma-
terial," "that of moment: impor-
tant, essential." "All" is defined as "the 
whole amount or quantity." "Substantial-
ly" as used here is an adverb modifying the 
noun "all." The case law has^not been 
helpful in the resolution of this question. 
In Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Utah v. 
Board of Review, 118 Utah 619, 223 P.2d 
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586, 22 A.L.R.2d 664 (1950) the Utah Su-
preme Court construed the phrase "ail or 
substantially all" as contained in Utah's un-
employment compensation law and noted 
that neither 25°c nor 75% of the assets of a 
corporation comprised "substantially all" of 
the assets involved. Unfortunately, on the 
facts of this case a quantitative analysis of 
the financial support is impossible. 
[5] The only evidence on this issue was 
given by Judith. She testified that her only 
sources of income were from James and 
from her Social Security disability benefits 
in the sum of $177.80 monthly. She was 
not working. James was not working when 
he returned to Kalispell but had been em-
ployed in Gillette in June and July of that 
year. He had also worked for her brother-
in-law. Her testimony conflicted for once 
she testified he only worked part time or 
periodically but that in June and July of 
1977 he was working "at least" five or six 
days a week; "He worked a lot." At Jim's 
he was employed full time. He took the job 
to make more money and he promised to 
send most of it home when he was paid. 
He told her by letter that he "should have a 
good check to send you a week from Fri-
day," but he died before he was paid. 
James, she testified, contributed financial 
support to her and the children, but never 
did she state in dollar figures how much he 
earned or contributed. 
The evidence is far from overwhelming 
but the district court concluded that James 
did in fact provide substantially all of the 
financial support. The amount of Judith's 
disability benefits was not large and com-
pared with that figure, James even working 
part time could have contributed substan-
tially all of the support. The award pro-
vides us with no method to ascertain more, 
and with the rules of appeal in mind we 
must affirm. 
We are mindful of the maxim that Work-
er's Compensation laws are to be interpret-
ed and applied with reasonable liberality so 
that the purposes for which the law was 
enacted may be accomplished and where 
possible the industry and not the individual 
should bear the burdens of accidents suf-
fered. In re McConnell, 45 Wyo. 289, 18 
P.2d 629 (1933); In re Gimiin, Wyo., 403 
P.2d 178 (1965); Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 
supra. These ideas formed the policy upon 
which the Worker's Compensation laws 
were based and comport with its history in 
this country and state. A History of Amer-
ican Law, L. M. Friedman. Simon & Schus-
ter, 1973, New York. N. Y., pp. 587-588; 
Prosser, Torts, 4th Ed., 1971; § 80, pp. 
530-531. 
The judgment and order of award is af-
firmed. 
Rudy Patino MUNOZ, a/k/a Rudy Mu-
noz, Appellant (Defendant below), 
v. 
Herb MASCHNER (Warden of Wyoming 
State Penitentiary), Honorable John T. 
Dixon (Fifth Judicial District Judge, 
Wyoming), Mr. J. E. Darrah and Mr. G. 
L. Simonton (Park County Prosecuting 
Attorneys), the People of the State of 
Wyoming, et al., Appellees (Respondents 
below). 
No. 4973. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
March 6, 1979. 
Proceeding was instituted on petition 
for postconviction relief. The District 
Court, Park County, Harold Joffe, J., dis-
missed petition, and petitioner appealed. 
The Supreme Court held that: (1) procedur-
al irregularity of failing to note value of 
stolen property on verdict did not constitute 
such an absence of fundamental fairness as 
to establish a basis for postconviction relief 
where evidence established without a doubt 
that petitioner stole property of a given 
money value, and (2) question whether 
J. In re Peterson's Estate. 365 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1961) 
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Court of Oregon in rejecting the rule adopt-
ed by this Court in Moore v. Skiles, supra, 
pointed up what they felt would be the 
incongruous result that would follow in the 
situation where a passenger who jointly 
owned the car did not know how to drive 
it. Suffice it to say that Oregon elects to 
follow a rule of law in this particular 
contrary to that preferred and adopted by 
this Court in the Moore case. 
As was stated in the Moore case, "The 
question is not solely whether the passenger 
actually exercised control over the driver, 
but whether the occupant had the right to 
exercise such control over the driver, or 
that the occupant and the driver * * * 
had a right jointly to control its operation." 
The "right to exercise * * * control" 
is not dependent upon the ability of the 
passenger to actually drive the vehicle. 
It is not contemplated that a co-owning 
passenger in exercising his right to control 
will physically wrest the wheel from the 
driver. Rather, verbal admonition, sug-
gestions or even outright commands are 
the usual methods whereby the co-owning 
passenger exercises his right to control. 
It is a well-known fact that some of the 
better ''back seat" drivers are those who 
know little, or nothing, about the actual 
driving of the vehicle, but can nonetheless 
still offer friendly advice, if not flat com-
mands, to the driver. 
In Matheny v. Central Motor Lines, Inc. 
et al.f 233 X.C. 681, 63 S.E.2d 368 the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina stated: 
"The fact that the plaintiff was co-owner 
and occupant of the automobile, and that it 
was being driven at the time by her husband 
with her consent for the common benefit 
and purpose of both would seem to establish 
the essential elements of a joint enterprise." 
(Emphasis supplied.) In the instant case 
the sole purpose of the ill-fated journey was 
to render a benefit to the one plaintiff, 
Doloris Parres. We see no good reason 
to depart from the rule announced in the 
Moore case, and stare decisis dictates that 
we must reject the contention of Doloris 
Parres and hold that the trial court properly 
instructed the jury that the negligence, if 
any, oi Lennie Parres was as a matter of 
law transferred and imputed to Doloris 
Parres. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
DOYLE. J., dissents. 
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In the Matter of the Estate of Archie L. 
PETERSON, a / k / a A. L. Peterson, 
Deceased. 
Elinor Bourne P E T E R S O N , 
Plaintiff in Error, 
v. 
Elsie L E W I S , formerly Elsie Durham, Laur-
el A. Peterson, and E. G. Woodbridge, as 
Administrator of the Estate of Archie L, 
Peterson, a /k /a A. L. Peterson, Deceased, 
Defendants In Error. 
No. 19283. 
Supreme Court of Colorado. 
In Department. 
Sept. 25. 1061. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 23, 1961. 
Proceeding on a petition to deter-
mine heirship wherein the party claiming 
to be the decedent's widow on the theory 
of a common law remarriage alleged heir-
ship in herself. The District Court, Otero 
County, William L. Gobin, J., rendered a 
judgment adverse to the purported wid-
ow, and she brought error. The Supreme 
Court, Frantz, J., held that the policy dis-
favoring divorce and encouraging resump-
tion and continuance of the marital tie 
enjoined relaxation in the matter of proof 
where the question of common law re-
marriage was involved. 
Reversed with directions. 
I. Appeal and Error < ^ I 0 ! 1(1) 
Resolution of conflicting evidence is 
for trier of facts, not Supreme Court, but 
where standards for weighing evidence 
IN RE PETERSON'S ESTATE 
Cite as 365 r .2d 254 
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upon which judgment was founded have 
been misapplied, reversal must follow. 
2. Marriage C=s| 
It is policy of law to encourage per-
manency and continuity of marriage and 
to look with disfavor upon its dissolution. 
3. Marriage C^50(l) 
Policy disfavoring divorce and en-
couraging resumption and continuance of 
the marital tie enjoined relaxation in mat-
ter of proof where question of common 
law remarriage subsequent to interlocu-
tory divorce decree was involved. 
Theodore J. Kuhlman, Charles A. Mur-
dock, Denver, for plaintiff in error. 
Thulemeyer & Stewart, La Junta, Pe-
tersen, Evensen & Evans, Pueblo, for de-
fendants in error, Elsie Lewis and Laurel 
A. Peterson. 
FRANTZ, Justice. 
Is the lawr as exacting and scrupulous 
respecting the proof necessary to estab-
lish a common law remarriage as it is re-
garding the proof required to make out a 
case of common law marriage? Does the 
policy of the lawT disfavoring divorce and 
encouraging resumption and continuance 
of the marital tie enjoin relaxation in the 
matter of proof where the question of re-
marriage is involved? Affirmance or re-
versal of the judgment entered in the trial 
of this case depends upon the answers to 
these questions. 
A petition to determine the heirs of Ar-
chie L. Peterson, also known as A. L. Pe-
terson, deceased, was filed in the county 
court by the sister of the deceased. Her 
brother joined in the relief sought. Eli-
nor Bourne Peterson, claiming to be the 
widow of the deceased, alleged heirship 
in herself. A judgment adverse to Mrs. 
Peterson was appealed to the district court, 
where her claim was again denied. 
In adjudging that Mrs. Peterson failed 
to establish that she was the common law 
wife of the deceased, the trial court con-
cluded : 
"If respondent hopes to establish 
her alleged status as a widow, it must 
be founded on proof of a common-law 
marriage subsequent to December 9, 
1955. In Klipfel's Estate v. Klipfel, 
41 Colo. 40, 92 P. 124, it was said that 
the existence of a common-law marri-
age may be proven by and presumed 
from evidence of cohabitation as hus-
band and wife and general repute. It 
was further said, that 'It is necessary 
that there be evidence both of cohabita-
tion and reputation before such mar-
riage can be presumed. Proof of one 
alone is not sufficient to sustain the pre-
sumption.' The court further quoted 
with approval from another case: 'It 
is not a sojourn, * * * to cohabit 
is to live and dwell together, to have 
the same habitation, so that where one 
lives and dwells there does the other 
live and dwell with him.' It further 
said that such a marriage contract 
must be established by convincing and 
positive evidence." 
It is not necessary to relate the evidence 
in detail. On the issue of the relation-
ship of the Petersons subsequent to the 
interlocutory decree of divorce, the evi-
dence is in dispute and in many instances 
permits of contrary inferences. There is 
substantial evidence showing that the Pe-
tersons reunited after the entry of the in-
terlocutory decree, and there is a body of 
evidence from which a common law re-
marriage could be educed. There is ad-
mittedly substantial evidence from which 
opposite conclusions could be drawn. 
[1] Generally this court, in reviewing 
the judgment of a trial court, refrains 
from doing anything more than ascertain-
ing that such judgment finds support in 
the sum of irreconcilable evidence. Reso-
lution of conflicting evidence is the func-
tion of the trier of the facts, not oi this 
court. Edwards v. Edwards, ,113 Colo. 
390, 157 P.2d 616. But where .standards 
for weighing the evidence upon which the 
judgment was founded have been misap-
plied, reversal must follow. 
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An often quoted statement from Hynes 
v. McDermott, 91 N.Y. 431, 43 Am.St. 
Rep. 67, is persuasive in our determina-
tion, particularly since it represents the 
essence oi what this court has said in a 
number of decisions involving remarriage 
—Githens v. Githens, 78 Colo. 102, 239 P. 
1023, 43 A.L.R. 547; Jordan v. Jordan, 
105 Colo. 171, 96 P.2d 13; Shreyer v. 
Shreyer, 113 Colo. 219, 155 P.2d 990. It 
was there said, ''The law presumes mor-
ality, and not immorality; marriage, and 
not concubinage; legitimacy, and not bas-
tardy." 
[2] The law has been resourceful in 
developing policies which give stability to 
the marriage state and seek to preserve it 
as a basic institution in our society. So 
important is the marital relation that the 
state is said to be an unnamed but vitally 
interested party in all actions affecting its 
existence. It is the policy of the law 
to encourage the permanency and continu-
ity of a marriage and to look with disfavor 
upon its dissolution. Githens v. Githens, 
supra. 
[3] "Remarriage is sufficiently rare in 
human affairs to justify regarding it as 
sui generis." In re Wagner's Estate, 1960, 
393 Pa. 531, 159 A.2d 495, 497. Thus re-
garded, Justice Bok fittingly distinguished 
between a common law marriage and a 
common law remarriage in these words: 
''These doctrines are familiar 
enough. We are, however, not deal-
ing with a first marriage but with a 
remarriage following divorce after 
twenty years of wedlock. In such 
case we think that the law's role of 
mere toleration of the common law 
relationship should be reversed and 
the status of remarriage favored, even 
if acquired with common law infor-
mality. If the law allows a spouse, 
in the generous amount of nine rea-
sons, to establish by divorce that the 
marriage was a mistake, it should 
be at least equally eager to let both 
spouses discover that their divorce 
was also a mistake. We regard it bet-
ter to encourage remarriage than to 
leave such parties under judicial edict 
that they were living sinfully together 
for ten years. If children had been 
born of this relationship, the wisdom 
of regularizing it if possible would 
be all the more apparent." 
The evidence in this case must be test-
ed and weighed in view of the considers 
tions set forth in this opinion. Not havin; 
been so treated, we reverse the jucsrmer. 
so that the evidence may be considered an< 
evaluated in manner consistent with th 
doctrines and policies expressed in thi. 
opinion. 
MOORE and DOYLE, JJ., concur. 
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Dorothy GRANT, Plaintiff in Error, 
v. 
Juanita GWYN, Defendant in Error. 
No. 19394. 
Supreme Court of Colorado. 
In Department. 
Sept. 25, 1961. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 23, 1961. 
Action for damages for assault where-
in defendant filed a counterclaim. The 
District Court of the City and County of 
Denver, Clifford J. Gobble, J., entered judg-
ment for plaintiff and defendant brought 
error. The Supreme Court, Moore, ]-, 
held that under a rule of procedure, a 
body execution could not issue against de-
fendant who was convicted in a criminal 
prosecution for the same wrrong, where mat-
ter of such conviction was called to court's 
attention prior to issuance of the execution. 
Judgment insofar as it authorized exe-
cution against body reversed, in all other 
respects affirmed. 
